
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG TASK FORCES IN MONTANA:

A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE EDWARD BYRNE
MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG)

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
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Executive Summary

Stakeholders from across the criminal justice system differ on how best to ease the financial and human impacts of drug abuse on institutions and individuals. Amid such deliberations, cost-benefit analyses can provide a valuable tool for informing drug policy. To help guide discussions about strategies for curbing drug crime, the Montana Board of Crime Control (MBCC) in 2016 contracted the University of Montana Criminology Research Group to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of statewide multijurisdictional drug task forces funded by the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG).



At the core of this analysis lies one primary question, “What financial costs and benefits are linked to JAG-funded multijurisdictional drug task forces (MJDTF) in Montana?” Attempting to answer that question involved an examination of dozens of numeric indicators, interviews with task force staff, and a review of hundreds of documents. Identification of costs hinged on an examination of financial inputs.

The examination of costs was constructed first upon annual reports compiled by MBCC detailing JAG funding and local contributions reported for grant purposes. The JAG program requires participating agencies to match the JAG contribution in support of task force operations by 30 percent. Beyond local matching funds, JAG revenue can be used alongside a variety of other revenue sources not typically recorded for Byrne Grant purposes. Other sources of MJDTF revenue include contributions from the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), agency labor contributions identified here as “hard funding,” and resources from the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) Narcotics Bureau at the Montana Department of Justice.

Annual sub-grant histories compiled by MBCC for the performance period indicate that participating law enforcement agencies received \$5.365 million in JAG funding and nearly \$6.454 million in local agency matching dollars. When examined alongside other revenue streams, such as HIDTA and hard funding beyond dollars accounted for in JAG quarterly and annual reporting, JAG support during the performance period constituted nearly 34 percent of all revenue. Throughout this analysis such JAG funding overlays are applied at the statewide and jurisdictional levels in an attempt to specifically isolate the effects of JAG funding.


The conversation about task force outputs and outcomes must be premised with an identification of inconsistencies in data reporting and collection throughout the performance period. Changes in reporting protocols and a transition to an online reporting format in 2013, the Montana Incident Based Reporting System (MTIBRS), prompted researchers for this inquiry to consult multiple sources of data, including reports from MBCC, MTIBRS, and self-reported case numbers from task forces, when such reports were available.

MTIBRS reports and data collected by MBCC indicate that JAG-funded MJDTFs in Montana during the performance period were involved with the arrests of more than 4,600 individuals and

responded to 7,445 incidents. CRG-compiled arrest data indicate that the collaborative efforts resulted in approximately 4,700 cases sent for adjudication.¹ To put the scale of JAG operations in context, it is helpful to look at overall drug crimes in Montana during the performance period. MTIBRS indicates that between FY11 and FY15, there were total 22,875 drug-related arrests resulting from all law enforcement operations statewide. Those numbers suggest that JAG MJDTFs in Montana were responsible for roughly 20 percent of all drug arrests during the performance period.

Applying the statewide 34-percent JAG funding overlay discussed above to arrest and adjudication numbers for the performance period shows the Byrne Grant responsible for sending 1,598 cases for adjudication (34 percent multiplied by 4,700 cases) and for being the primary funding source behind 1,565 arrests and citations (the 34 percent JAG funding overlay multiplied by 4,602 arrests).

The average cost of an arrest during the performance period including all funding streams totaled \$3,509 when taking an average among all task forces. Total costs calculated for sending an MJDTF case for adjudication totaled \$3,418.31. When applying the JAG funding overlay of 34 percent to the overall cost of making an arrest and the overall cost of sending a case for adjudication, the Byrne Grant may be considered responsible for \$1,193.2 in costs per arrest and \$1,162.22 in expenses for sending one case for adjudication. (For more information on how the costs itemized here were calculated, see “Average cost of arrest calculation” in the Appendix).




¹ This number is based on inclusion of imputed data for NWMDTF and BMRDTF. Absent information on the number of cases sent for adjudication, CRG estimated the number of cases the task force would have sent for adjudication based on the overall average percentage of arrests to cases for prosecution gathered from the five task forces that reported those numbers. The overall ratio of arrests to cases for adjudication totaled just more than 102 percent. The number of cases sent for prosecution was likely higher than the number of arrests due to underreporting in MTIBRS during a transition to the online reporting system beginning in 2013.

SWMDTF during the performance period reported a total of 114 cases to adjudication. Largely because of a significant decline in the number of cases sent for adjudication in FY13, SWMDTF has the highest per-adjudication average cost of any other JAG task force in Montana, at \$14,790. WCMDTF came in at the opposite end of the cost spectrum, averaging \$289.66 per case to adjudication for the five-year study period.

Performance reports filed with MBCC indicate that task forces statewide seized more than 2.5 million grams of marijuana, 37,481 grams of methamphetamine, 4,851 grams of powder cocaine, and 1,507 grams of heroin. Drug seizure amounts are reported in a variety of metrics, including by pound, kilogram, dosage unit, plant, pill, and gram. To streamline information delivery, the smallest common denominator among reporting categories, weight measured in grams, is

aggregated. While this strategy enables a more comprehensive examination of the total amount of drugs seized by MJDTFs, it suffers from a downfall, in that using the smallest purchasing unit inflates the value of drugs seized.


With that said, the total value of marijuana seized for the performance period was estimated to be worth \$37 million; crack cocaine valued at \$87,956, and powder cocaine



\$553,482. Heroin seized was estimated to be worth \$150,747; meth \$3.998 million, and hash \$14,568. The seizures together reflect an estimated per-gram street value of \$41.807 million.

Between fiscal years 11 and 13, 71.14 percent of cases categorized by primary offense were for drug possession; 17.14 percent were for distribution, and just more than 4 percent for manufacture.

ARRESTS BY PRIMARY OFFENSE ALL MJDTF FY11-FY13



FY11-FY13 arrests by primary drug offense	Other combined reports	Production/ manufacture	Distribution total number charges across task force	Possession/possession with intent total number charges across task force	Total
BMRDTF	1	12	36	177	226
EMDTF	12	6	23	76	117
MRDTF	36	34	179	181	430
NWMDTF	101	27	91	157	376
SWMDTF	17	9	43	34	103
TATF	24	9	88	108	229
WCMDTF	46	32	75	1488	1641
Total	237	129	535	2221	3122
Percentage	7.59	4.13	17.14	71.14	100.00

In fiscal years 14 and 15, distribution constituted 2.4 percent of all charges, and production or manufacture totaled .49 percent. MTIBRS indicates that .07 of all charges, or two cases, filed in fiscal years 14 and 15 were for drug-involved child endangerment. Less than 1 percent of all cases reported through MTIBRS (25) in FY14 and FY15 were related to the Group B offense of endangering the welfare of children. These sums are lower than those reported in MJDTF quarterly narratives, which show that task forces were involved in 73 drug endangered children


cases in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Reports compiled by MBCC show that between 2011 and 2013, MJDTFs intervened in 233 cases of child endangerment.

Beyond simply tallying up outputs, this analysis attempts to quantify both the costs and the benefits of MJDTF operations. Guidance in this endeavor comes from the MJDTF mission statement and JAG crime-fighting directives, which are drawn from to create four cost objectives capable of helping to identify JAG priorities. Based on the MJDTF mission statement and JAG's commitment to crime fighting, four desired task force cost objectives were identified. Those objectives are to: disrupt and dismantle entities that manufacture, sell, and traffic in unlawful narcotics; address narcotic-related violence; reduce the supply and demand of dangerous drugs, and decrease drug-related crime. Drawing from Rhodes' performance measurement template, each objective is linked to a series of measureable indicators. (2009).

The four cost objectives serve as a means for classifying performance and also serve as a platform for monetizing outputs. Because of the propensity for addiction to carry forward to the next generation (Nurco et al.1999), the number of endangered children interventions conducted is categorized under the objective, "Reducing the supply and demand of dangerous drugs," for instance. The number of arrests for crimes against property, meanwhile, is classified under Objective 1, to "decrease drug-related crime."

Key performance metrics were monetized whenever possible. Estimates of the financial value associated with intervening in drug endangered children cases is provided, along with a discussion about MJDTF training and community events. Cash seizures are identified, as is the street value of drugs and weapons confiscated by task forces. Academic literature from the criminology and cost benefit realms is drawn upon as a guide for valuing MJDTF outputs such as arrests for distribution and weapons charges.

Before proceeding, it is important to keep in mind that crime triggers a vast range of negative externalities that cannot be fully encapsulated, let alone effectively costed. Crime interrupts labor markets and housing prices. Drug addiction itself, meanwhile, is responsible for an array of externalities arising in medical, and social services. Amid such sprawling externalities, CRG set out to encapsulate a narrow set of outputs and outcomes to state the net cost and benefit of the JAG MJDTF program.



This analysis allocates dollars to outputs based on the best available data. It should be seen as an attempt to pave the way for similar efforts, rather than an exhaustive evaluation. To monetize the costs of outputs, such as those involved with training and facilitating community events, the cost of labor hours available to MJDTF officers was multiplied by the estimated of number of training hours and those invested in facilitating community events drawn from quarterly performance reports. The value of labor hours were calculated from JAG grant funding applications, which was then applied to the amount of funding available for labor in each fiscal

year, based on sub-grant histories provided by MBCC. Travel expenses were summed and then included on top of the hourly labor cost to create what into what Wayson and Funke in their discussion about criminal justice costing called a “loaded resource unit.” (1989) The units represent all estimated costs associated with an MJDTF officer’s time, in addition to matching financial supports, such as those contributed for administration, HIDTA contributions and agency hard funding. Attaching a dollar value to each unit of labor enabled all outputs to be measured by a common unit, aggregated to value program costs, and disaggregated to gain a more focused perspective.

Literature Review

In the 1980s, law enforcement began applying an economic model to policing the manufacture, transport, and sale of unlawful drugs. The idea was that a reduction in the supply of drugs through law enforcement interventions coupled with efforts to decrease demand constituted the appropriate approach for curbing drug crime. Supply side enforcement, which the MJDTF mission statement focuses on, is premised upon the idea that policing makes drug trafficking, manufacturing, and use risky, thereby deterring potential drug entrepreneurs and users from entering unlawful drug markets.

This school of thought contributed to the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which provides funding for the Bureau of Justice to administer the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG). JAG is used to fund state-level programs designed to combat problems resulting from crime, drug addiction, and drug trafficking. JAG provides states and units of local governments with funding for a broad range of initiatives in seven general program areas, including law enforcement; prosecution and courts; prevention and education; corrections and community corrections; drug treatment and enforcement; planning, evaluation, and technology improvement; and crime victim and witness support. MJDTFs across the country are funded through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.

The premise supporting continued funding of MJDTF operations is that by increasing cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies, there will be greater reductions in the supply of and demand for illicit drugs than the public would otherwise experience.

Drug task force operate also upon the principle of impulse-response analysis. Interdiction activities serve as the impulse, which ought to trigger fluctuations in drug prices, considered the response (National Research Council (NRC) 2001). The consequences of such interventions should be observable. Traditional economic analysis predicts that if interdiction and domestic enforcement succeed in reducing the supply of drugs, then drug prices will rise, and consumption will fall (NRC 2001 p. 144).”

One of the first evaluations of MJDTF operations was conducted by Sabath, Doyle, and Ransburg (1990). Their study was based on quarterly report data detailing drug arrest numbers, in addition to drug seizure information and interviews with drug task force commanders. The researchers concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that Indiana drug task forces, which had been operational for two years prior to the investigation, had met the goals and objectives for which they were established. Goals cited in that study included arresting and prosecuting major drug dealers, reducing the availability of drugs, and establishing cooperative

working relationships with other drug enforcement agencies.

An examination of nine studies evaluating six different MJDTF operations conducted by Mazerolle et al. (2007) found mixed results of task force efficacy curbing drug crime. Some studies found task force membership associated with significant increases in police outputs, such as arrests and seizures (Decker et al., 2000; Pullen & Mande, 1991; Ramker, 1999; Witt, Brown, & Bushweiler, 1995). Other evaluations, however, found no discernable effect on drug arrests but rather only improved communication and perceptions of quality of efforts (Frank, Smith, Novak, Travis, & Langworthy, 1998; Herzik, Bartridge, & Hoyt, 1998; Jefferis, Frank, Smith, Novak, & Travis, 1998; B. Smith, Novak, Frank & Travis, 2000). (Mazerolle 2007).

The improved communication cited in the 2007 MJDTF evaluation by Mazerolle et al. was also referenced by Frantzan in 2009, and Levine and Martin in 1992, who found that it positively affected the quality of drug enforcement outputs. Frantzan specifically noted that High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area collaborative efforts, which operate on the same model as MJDTFs, yielded more arrests and more serious drug cases than vehicle searches and resulting seizures.

This supply and demand model of drug policing squares with the economic approach, which holds that both drug traffickers and drug users are rational actors. Proponents of supply and demand policing often argue that drugs and crime are linked. Cited frequently in this debate is the 2004 Bureau of Justice (BJS) Statistics Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, which found that 17 percent of state prisoners committed their crime to obtain money for drugs. That Bureau of Justice in 2002, meanwhile, found that roughly a quarter of convicted property and drug offenders in local jails in 2002 committed their crimes to get money for narcotics. Other respected criminologists hold that there is a direct link between heavy drug use and crime. (Goldstein 1985; Cohen 2009).

However, those arguments are not the only stance found the academic literature. Critics of the existing supply and demand model of narcotic enforcement argue that the costs associated with policing and incarceration of drug offenders are higher than the positive societal benefits resulting from such enforcement strategies.

Benson et al. (1992; 1996), for example, found an increased emphasis on policing drug-related crime in between 1986 and 1987 in Florida relative to policing crimes such as burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny, led to an approximately .2 percent to .34 percent decrease in the probability of arrests for a property crime. Benson and Rasmussen (1992) found a similar phenomenon at work in Illinois. There was no property crimes offense rate increase in that instance, but detentions for DUI dropped by 23 percent. The argument resulting from those findings is that an increased emphasis on policing one type of crime incurs opportunity costs to other arenas.

McCollister (2010), meanwhile, posits that a drug sale transaction absent violence or other specific externalities, which are discussed in subsequent sections of this document, may yield minimal harm to society as a whole. “The act of purchasing illegal substances transfers income from one member of society (drug user) to another (drug dealer). Absent any negative externalities ... the net effect on society is negligible. (McCollister 2010 p. 107).” As policy

experts and academics debate how best to stem the institutional and social costs associated with drug-abuse, the following analysis aims to shed light on the debate.

Methodology

Articulation of identifiable objectives serves as the cornerstone of any organizational analysis. As such, the CRG first set out to identify task force goals. MJDTF goals articulated in a shared mission statement directs task forces to:

“Provide a collaborative federal, state, and local law enforcement effort to identify, target, and address those involved in drug trafficking, manufacturing, and/or violence. The task forces will utilize sophisticated long-term investigative approaches, including undercover surveillance to disrupt and dismantle targeted drug organizations.” (MBCC Montana’s Statewide Strategic Plan 2013-2015 p.13).

A review of the MJDTF mission statement helped to identify three broad desired task force goals.

- 1.) To disrupt and dismantle entities that manufacture, sell, and traffic in unlawful drugs
- 2.) To address narcotic related violence
- 3.) To reduce the supply and demand of dangerous drugs

A fourth goal was identified through a review of JAG directives:

- 4.) To decrease drug-related crime

To achieve broad objectives, MJDTFs engage in specific activities, including intelligence sharing, investigations, and collaboration. Outputs are simply measureable derivatives of activities, which may be used to gauge to what extent an organization (or, as in this case, a group of them) is taking steps to fulfill the organizational mission.

As illustrated in the logic model below, MJDTF activities include intelligence sharing, investigations, and collaboration. The MJDTF Cost-Benefit Analysis outcome-sequence chart is perhaps most important in its role as a conceptual framework capable of helping to facilitate a discussion about MJDTF operations. As indicated in the chart, financial inputs directly fuel outputs, such as work units produced. Environmental inputs, too, such as geographical and socioeconomic factors, were considered for this report.




Figure 1 MJDTF Cost-Benefit Analysis outcome sequence chart

To go beyond simply measuring MJDTF performance, estimates of costs and benefits were made for outputs and outcomes whenever possible. Already in numeric form, outputs were well suited for translation into cost objectives, or a separate unit of measurement suitable for monetization (Wayson 1989). As identified in the outcome sequence chart, measurable outputs (cost objectives) identified include arrests, drug seizures, cash forfeitures, individuals trained, and the number of community educational events facilitated by MJDTFs.

Strategies used for monetizing cost objectives included what economists call the “top-down” and “bottom up” approaches. A bottom-up strategy necessitates investigating all costs related to a single unit of output. “This typically means identifying all the employees who are responsible for a unit of output, identifying how much time each person spends on that unit of output, and then multiplying that time by the cost of each employee’s time spent on the activity.” (Vera 2014)

The bottom-up portion of this analysis was informed by MBCC reports, including sub-grant histories and narratives, in addition to performance and quarterly filings. Interviews with task force commanders further informed the data review. Because a bottom-up analysis is constructed upon an examination of labor costs, hourly pay rates with fringe benefits were calculated for individual task force jurisdictions. This examination was informed by Sherman and Rogan’s 1995 evaluation, which identified labor hours as inputs, Rhodes’s 2007 template for evaluating MJDTF performance, the Vera Institute of Justice’s 2014 Cost-Benefit Analysis Toolkit, and the Georgia Statistical Analysis Center’s 2014 MJDTF Impact Evaluation.

Because task forces often contract with partnering agencies for services, rather than simply employing full-time staff, it was important to calculate the total number of labor hours available, rather than simply citing the number of full-time MJDTF employees. To estimate the number of labor hours available for task force operations. The hourly rate of pay including fringe was divided into the total amount allocated under for labor² under the JAG program.

Hourly labor rates were used as the basis for constructing what Wayson (1989) calls a “loaded resource unit.” The term describes the dollar amount of all direct and indirect costs associated with a measure of resource use. A measure of resource use for this analysis is one hour of a task force officer’s time, including operational, travel, and administrative expenses.

A parallel cost, one used to account for HIDTA contributions and hard funded labor expenses, as detailed in interviews and emails with MJDTF staff, was also estimated and broken down based on hourly estimates. (Vera 2014, McIntosh and Li 2012). Hard funding contributions and other financial support was also itemized to assist in identification of JAG-specific outcomes.

The above itemized steps were utilized to engage in the bottom-up approach. Hourly labor and matching funds were used to estimate the expenses associated with facilitating community events and receiving training, activities with associated metrics that were reported in a largely consistent manner throughout the performance period. While training and community events typically take a predictable amount of time, the hours associated with making arrests and preparing case for adjudication are not fixed. Absent a way to calculate from the bottom up the average costs of making an arrest or preparing a case for adjudication, those costs were calculated with a “top-down” approach. Costs associated with making an arrest was derived by dividing the total amount of labor costs remaining after community event facilitation and training costs were taken away. This method was used also to estimate the average expense associated with referring one case for adjudication from the statewide perspective and from a jurisdictional perspective.

Because arrest reporting mechanisms including MTIBRS, do not isolate JAG-specific outputs, it is impossible to isolate JAG-funded arrests versus those supported by HIDTA, for instance, or to isolate outputs resulting from labor expenses fueled by local coffers. The result leaves a pool of numeric task force outputs, including the types and quantities of drugs seized and the number of arrests made, resulting from a hodgepodge of funding streams. Pinpointing one set of outputs, therefore, required sifting through other funding streams to estimate JAG’s impact. Information on funding beyond that routinely reported in JAG quarterly and annual reports was collected to the extent that doing so was possible.

Calculations for this analysis show JAG funding for the performance period constituted nearly 34 percent of all revenue for MJDTFs. This method of identifying JAG inputs and outputs, gathering all information in financial inputs and then parsing out the JAG portion as a percentage, is used throughout this document. “JAG funding overlays,” as they are called, are used at the statewide level to measure overall JAG impacts, applying the 34 percent number, for instance, to the total number of arrests made by MJDTFs throughout the performance period. This application of the overall statewide JAG funding overlay to the total number of arrests

² MBCC sub-grant histories

between FY11 and FY15, 4,602, yielded a total estimated arrest number of 1,565 individuals. JAG funding overlays are used at the jurisdictional level, too, for isolating regional JAG outputs and associated outcomes.³

Before proceeding with further analysis, it is important to note additional limitations inherent to the data presented here. MTIBRS, a primary source of arrest information for fiscal years 14 and 15, does not allow for identification of the number of felonies versus misdemeanors related to task force work. Another data challenge came from a MJDTF transition from a hard-copy paper reporting system to the MTIBRS online format beginning in 2013. For this reason, readers will note changes in how this analysis reports information beginning in FY 14. MJDTF commanders and administrators through the course of this analysis reported they did not completely transition to MTIBRS reporting until 2015.⁴ It is possible that the changeover is reflected in what appears to be a significant drop-off in the quality of arrests (For more on arrest quality, see Sherman 2013 p. 422).

Absent detailed offense information from FY11-FY13, estimates were made for the number of MJDTF involved property and persons crimes during those years. Those estimates were based on the comparably detailed information provided through MTIBRS in FY14 and FY15. The online crime-reporting database indicated that 7.83 percent of all offenses in FY14 and FY15 were related to crimes against property. That percentage was applied to the total number of arrests in FY14 and FY15 to estimate that 116 arrests in those years involved property crimes. That number was then divided by two to arrive at a minimum estimate of the total number of MJDTF-related property crimes to occur annually. That annual estimate was multiplied by five, reflecting each year in the performance period to estimate a minimum of 291 total MJDTF-involved property crimes between FY11 and FY15.

MTIBRS FY14 and FY15 data was also drawn from to calculate the types of property crimes MJDTFs were most frequently involved in. Based on information in the online database indicating that 50 percent of MJDTF-involved property crimes in FY14 and FY15 related to theft and shoplifting, it was estimated that 146 arrests (half of 291) during the performance period were associated with those crimes. A similar procedure was conducted for the other most frequently reported MJDTF property crime arrests, including criminal mischief, burglary, and robbery to arrive at estimates for the total number of each type of MJDTF-involved arrests for the entire performance period. Calculations to arrive at the total number of persons crimes for the performance period were made in the same manner. MTIBRS shows that 4.37 percent of offenses in FY14 and FY15 were related to persons offenses. When applying that number to the total arrests in those years, it was estimated that there were 32 persons crimes annually during the performance period, or a total of 162 MJDTF-related persons crimes.

This procedure constituted an imperfect strategy for calculating the number of persons and property offenses. However, without more detailed information on the number of such arrests, it provided a mechanism for valuing MJDTF interventions with the alleged perpetrators of such crimes.

³ Difficulties arose tracking local hard-funding contributions, such as agency costs for office rental and utilities. Readers should keep in mind that JAG funding overlays constitute rough estimates.

⁴ Interviews and emails with EMDTF and SWMDTF

In a further attempt to reconcile reporting inconsistencies. CRG requested from task forces the number of cases submitted for adjudication on an annual basis. All but two of the task forces analyzed here presented that information. No self-reported data was obtained from the Big Muddy River Drug Task Force, which shuttered in 2013. NWMDTF, meanwhile, was unable to provide the number of cases submitted for adjudication.

Disposition outcomes were compiled first through requests of task forces for outcome data. The requests yielded mixed results. Some task forces compiled much of the requested information, others did not. The West Central Montana Drug Task Force (WCMDTF) in consultation with the Missoula County Attorney's Office refused to provide defendant names or case numbers. But WCMDTF provided a significant amount of detail on specific charges filed throughout the performance period. The Eastern Montana Drug Task Force (EMDTF) and Missouri River Drug Task Force (MRDTF) provided comprehensive reports of their output-related activities, while NWMDTF was hard pressed to even provide the number of cases it opened during the performance period.

Interviews with MJDTF commanders were conducted to better insure the accuracy of data compiled and for qualitative insights into task force accomplishments and challenges. Data from the Montana Office of the Court Administrator, which provides a comprehensive perspective on the number of drug-related charges referred to state courts and associated outcomes was used to guide estimates of adjudication expenses, which for the purposes of this analysis are considered an opportunity cost.

A monetization of drugs, weapons, and cash seized through task force operations was estimated, as did calculations of the average per-arrest and per-adjudication expense for each task force. Individual task force calculations are reported in the "MJDTF profile" portion of this document alongside overall behavioral and criminal indicators compiled from countywide information and aggregated at the regional level. In each profile, the number of arrests conducted by each task force is calculated, along with the number of cases sent for disposition (Disposition data for NWMDTF and BMRDTF is imputed based on the arrest-to-adjudication ratio of the five other task forces).

Key performance metrics were monetized whenever possible. Estimates of the financial value associated with intervening in drug-endangered children cases is provided, along with a discussion about MJDTF training and community events. Cash seizures are identified, as is the street value of drugs confiscated by task forces. Academic literature from the criminology and cost benefit realms is drawn upon as a guide for valuing MJDTF work.


Arrest rates for four categories of crime, including offenses against person, property, and society, in addition to Group B offenses, such as disorderly conduct and non-violent family offenses, were examined for evidence of variation between task force counties and non-task force counties. Differences resulting from changes in task force jurisdictional boundaries also prompted scrutiny of regional crime rates, in addition to behavioral health data, including the Montana Office of Public Instruction's Youth Risk Behavior Survey and information from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services Substance Abuse Management

(SAMS) database, which charts the number of admissions to state-licensed drug-treatment facilities.

As part of an effort to quantify all possible costs and benefits associated with MJDTF operations, adjudication expenses are quantified. Case and disposition data from task forces are used as a reference point for requesting from county prosecutors additional outcome information, whether a defendant was found guilty, for example, of whether or not charges were dropped. In response to CRG’s informational request, county attorneys provided everything from a stack of individual judicial orders relevant to specific cases to hand-written reporting provided via scanned legal pad paper. What CRG produced from this line of inquiry was a handful of snapshots of task force outcomes. Those snapshots, in conjunction with adjudication data from the Montana Office of the Court Administrator, which keeps comprehensive records on drug crime outcomes, served as the basis for monetization of MJDTF effects. The exploration of outcomes identified in this report includes an estimation of costs associated with incarcerating individuals found guilty of crimes alleged by task forces and also costs associated with community supervision. Before exploring output and outcome data, this report looks to program inputs.

Program inputs

To achieve goals, task forces rely on financial inputs. As illustrated in the graph below, the Missouri River and Northwest Montana drug task forces received the largest proportion of federal JAG funding of all seven task forces examined.



Inputs chronicled here are drawn from annual and quarterly financial history reports compiled by MBCC, in addition to emails and interviews with MJDTF commanders and administrators. Byrne grant funding obligates participating agencies to match the JAG contribution by 30 percent. During the performance period, it was common for task forces to exceed that requirement. Beyond local agency contributions reported to satisfy the match requirement, JAG revenue is comingled with inputs not typically documented for the Byrne Grant, such as revenue from the federally funded Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, agency contributions of staffing identified here as “hard funding” support, and resources from the



Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) Narcotics Bureau at the Montana Department of Justice.

Because identifying JAG specific outcomes constitutes a central directive for this project, JAG funding is disaggregated from other funding streams throughout the examination that follows. The strategy allows not just Byrne Grant specific inputs to be identified, but also assists with identification and monetization of JAG specific outputs.

All MJDTF FY11- FY15	JAG	Local match	Other revenue	DCI/FBI/Hard funded from local agencies contribution	HIDTA	Total
Total	\$5,364,999	\$6,453,837	\$224,261	\$2,082,146	\$1,790,804	\$15,916,047
Percent	33.71	40.55	1.41	13.08	11.25	100.00

The chart above illustrates JAG's role among other financial inputs. Annual sub-grant histories compiled by MBCC indicate that participating law enforcement agencies received \$5.365 million in JAG funding and contributed \$6.454 million in local agency matching dollars during the five-year performance period examined in this investigation. When examined alongside other revenue streams identified for this analysis, such as HIDTA and hard funding beyond that reported for the Byrne Grant up to this point, JAG support during the performance period constitutes roughly 34 percent of all revenue supporting MJDTF operations.

The graph below, meanwhile, shows how, during the performance period, all MJDTF inputs fueled primary task force outputs, arrests and cases for adjudication.



The average cost of an arrest during the performance period totaled \$3,509.51 including all funding streams. (This number is based on fiscal year averages among all task forces. Specific MJDTF averages are itemized in the profile section of this document.) Total costs calculated for sending an MJDTF case for adjudication totaled \$3,418.31. When applying the JAG funding overlay of 34 percent to the overall cost of making an arrest and the overall cost of sending a case for adjudication, the Byrne Grant

may be considered responsible for \$1,193.2 in costs per arrest and \$1,162.22 in expenses associated with sending a case to adjudication. (For more information on how the costs itemized here were calculated, see the “Average cost of arrest calculation” in the Appendix at the end of this document. Forfeiture, which comprised nearly 18 percent of overall revenue during the performance period, is discussed in more detail in the next section of this report.

Task force profiles

Taking the best available data, CRG built profiles of each task force and its regional characteristics. Seeking to create a comprehensive picture of each DTF jurisdiction as a whole, dozens of variables were examined to track regional crime rates, DTF arrest and prosecution numbers, and physical characteristics including miles of highway, commuter railroad and Canadian border. The number of individuals sentenced to the Montana Department of Corrections custody, and behavioral health information, such as the number of individuals per 1,000 admitted into state sanctioned drug treatment programs and how many people checked into hospitals with drug-related complaints is examined on a countywide level.

For the first two years of this analysis' performance period, the Wolf Point Police Department served as the sub-grantee for the Big Muddy River Task Force. Beginning in fiscal year 2014, the Big Muddy River Task Force ceased activity. The absence of an MJDTF in the northeastern portion of the state provides an opportunity to evaluate to what extent behavioral trends, such as drug treatment admissions and youth drug use, may have been affected, in addition to alterations in crime rates.

To monetize the costs of outputs, such as those involved with training and facilitating community events, the number of labor hours expended by MJDTF officers was estimated based on JAG program funding. The value of labor hours were calculated from JAG grant funding applications, which was then applied to the amount of funding available for labor in each fiscal year, based on sub-grant histories provided by MBCC. Travel expenses were summed and then included on top of the hourly labor cost to create what into what Wayson and Funke (1989) in their discussion about criminal justice costing called a "loaded resource unit." The units represent all estimated costs associated with an MJDTF officer's time, in addition to matching financial supports, such as those contributed for administration, HIDTA contributions and agency hard funding. Attaching a dollar value, or shadow price, to each unit of labor enabled all outputs to be measured by a common unit, aggregated to provide a total dollar value of program costs, and disaggregated to gain a more focused perspective. (Wayson and Funke 1989; Karoly 2008).

Though MJDTFs share a mission statement, each task force is unique. Differentiation is evidenced by differing funding streams among them. Some task forces receive funding through the federally supported Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), for example, while others do not. Montana MJDTFs direct resources in a similarly unique manner. Some direct JAG funds primarily to employ full-time staff, as is the case in Missoula, which has two full-time JAG detectives. Other MJDTFs devote a comparably larger proportion of their JAG support to contract with partnering agencies for labor.

JAG-funded task forces are also unique in their socio-economic and geographical environments, regional income levels differ for instance, as does transportation infrastructure, such as the presence of interstate highways, commuter rail stations, and proximity to the Canadian border.

Northwest Montana Drug Task Force (NWMDTF)

The Northwest Montana Drug Task Force (NWMDTF) between fiscal years 2011 and 2014 was comprised of Flathead, Lincoln, Sanders, Lake, and Mineral counties, in addition to the

Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes. Glacier County joined NWMDTF in FY 15, growing the collaborative effort to 18 law enforcement agencies, including the Whitefish and Polson police departments.


The task force received more JAG funding than any other during the performance period. NWMDTF's jurisdictional area in FY15 encompassed 17,207 square miles and hosted a population of roughly 172,775 people. Seventy-six and a half interstate miles ran through the task force's jurisdiction in FY2015, in addition to 444.41 miles on non-interstate highway. U.S. Census reports indicate the median household income for the NWMDTF region prior to Glacier County joining the task force in 2015 was \$38,029.20.

NWMDTF is unique in part due to the Amtrak Empire Builder passenger rail service that carries people east from the Hi-Line and west to Portland and Vancouver, Washington through the task force's jurisdiction, which includes train stations at Cut Bank, East Glacier Park, Essex, Whitefish, and Libby. Strategies used by NWMDTF to combat unlawful narcotic trafficking along the train route include the Viper Operation, a collaboration among local and federal law enforcement agents. NWMDTF partners during the performance period included the U.S. Border Patrol, the Montana Highway Patrol, U.S. Homeland Security, Flathead and Blackfeet Indian reservation tribal police, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.

The Flathead County Sheriff's Office is charged with managing JAG funds from MBCC. NWMDTF during the performance period documented more JAG resources, including from local matching funds, than any other task force.⁵ Of NWMDTF's \$3.32 million in revenue reported for the Byrne Grant to MBCC as reflected in sub-grant histories, \$1.34 million was from JAG and \$1.98 from participating agencies.

NWMDTF made 673 arrests during the performance period, according to MTIBRS and MBCC reports. The task force was unable to produce for CRG the number of cases it sent for adjudication. MBCC and MTIBRS reports, therefore, serve as primary references for this analysis.

⁵ The Missouri River Drug Task Force (MRDTF) received \$1.47 million in JAG funding, more than NWMDTF. But MRDTF reported less in matching funds, \$1.722 million. MRDTF's reported funding for the performance period at \$3.192 million, is \$128,749 than that of NWMDTF.)



The average JAG-supported per-arrest cost for NWMDTF during the performance period was \$2,102.

All NWMDTF revenue documented for this report summed to just more than \$4.1 million. Of that total, JAG funding constituted 32.72 percent, or \$1.342

million. Local matching funds reported to MBCC totaled \$1,978,618, or 48.25 percent. HIDTA funding summed to \$581,655, or 14.18 percent.

MBCC reports and MTIBRS indicate NWMDTF during the performance period arrested 673 people. To better isolate JAG-specific outputs, the NWMDTF JAG funding contribution of 32.72 percent was multiplied by the total number of NWMDTF arrests for the performance period. Based on that application, JAG funding may be seen as primarily responsible for 220 arrests.

An average resource unit encompassing NWMDTF costs was calculated based first on estimates of the hourly rate of pay including fringe for drug task force officers.⁶ Document reviews and conversations with NWMDTF staff indicated that NWMDTF officers during the five-year performance period earned on average \$35.78 hourly including fringe. When factoring in expenses associated with administration, the support of HIDTA funding, and agency contributions beyond those reported for the JAG grant, the average hour of a NWMDTF officer's time was valued at between \$45 and \$53. (For a more detailed explanation of hourly resource unit calculations, see "Average cost of arrest calculation in the Appendix at the end of this document).

Total forfeiture revenue for the performance period was \$1,187,876. In FY13, cash proceeds from such filings reached a performance period peak, summing to \$543,069.

NWMDTF	Sum of Forfeiture revenue
FY11	\$261,606.33
FY12	\$307,283.85
FY13	\$543,069.18
FY14	\$45,806.14
FY15	\$30,110.34
Grand Total	\$1,187,875.84

⁶ Sub-grant narrative reports, sub-grant histories, and discussions and emails with NWMDTF Commander Mark Mulcahy and administrative support Lauren Callahan.

Between FY11 and FY13:

- Possession charges for NWMDTF totaled the largest proportion of arrests classified by primary offense, 41.76 percent
- The “other” category of arrest by primary offense constituted the second most frequently cited arrests by primary offense, at 26.86 percent
- Distribution was the primary offense associated with arrest in 24.2 percent of cases
- Production and manufacture constituted 7.18 percent of arrests by primary offense

NWMDTF Arrests by primary offense	Production/manufacture	Distribution total number charges across task force	Possession/possession with intent	Other arrests	Total
FY11	7	36	57	50	150
FY12	5	15	71	28	119
FY13	15	40	29	23	107
Total	27	91	157	101	376
Percentage	7.18	24.20	41.76	26.86	100.00

- In fiscal years 11 through 13, marijuana was the most frequently implicated drug in NWMDTF arrests, at 28.92 percent⁷

NWMDTF	Narcotics	Mushroom	Heroin	Meth	Three or more	Ecstasy	Cocaine	Other drugs	Unknown	Two summed	Marijuana	Total
FY11	25	2	2	42	0	1	3	1	31	0	43	150
FY12	16	0	3	16	0	1	1	2	18	12	44	113
FY13	10	0	20	32	2	0	3	4	15	1	20	107
Grand Total	51	2	25	90	2	2	7	7	64	13	107	370
Percent	13.78	0.54	6.76	24.32	0.54	0.54	1.89	1.89	17.30	3.51	28.92	100

⁷ The number of drug types reported in FY11-FY13 Combined reports was five more than the number of arrests documented in those same reports for the same period.


As reported by MTIBRS for FY14 and FY15:

- The possession and possession with intent category garnered the highest number of citations, 31.61 percent
- Group B offenses were the second most frequently cited, at 25.86 percent of all charges
- Paraphernalia constitutes the third most common offense type, at 20.88 percent of all charges

NWMDTF made more distribution arrests in FY13 than at any other time during the performance period. Production charges that year also constituted a higher percentage of charges filed than at any other time.

When evaluating the change in percentage of higher quality

drug arrests over time, readers should keep in mind that the 2013 transition to MTIBRS provided more crime classification categories than were available before. Contrary to the prior reporting protocol, task forces can now report interventions in shoplifting offenses and violent crimes, such as partner family member assault. There was therefore a significant change in data presentation mid-way through the performance period. That said, conversations with MBCC staff suggests that task forces are now largely compliant with MTIBRS reporting directives. Researchers are hopeful that MJDTF data presented via MTIBRS two years post transition to the online system reflects an accurate reflection of task force outputs.



Missouri River Drug Task Force (MRDTF)

The Missouri River Drug Task Force (MRDTF) in FY 15 was comprised of Lewis and Clark, Gallatin, Park, Broadwater, Madison and Meagher counties. Member agencies include the cities of Bozeman, Helena, Belgrade, Livingston and West Yellowstone. The MRDTF jurisdictional area in FY 15 encompassed 16,037 square miles and supported approximately 195,278 people. The jurisdiction has 132 miles of interstate highway and 299 miles of non-interstate highway. The median household income for participating counties averaged \$41,955 during the performance period. The Gallatin County Sheriff's Office serves as sub-grantee for Byrne funding.

MRDTF reports holding more intelligence meetings than any other task force. They include weekly gatherings in Helena and Bozeman, in addition to routine discussions with Gallatin

County, the Bozeman Police Department, Montana State University, Belgrade Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Montana Highway Patrol.


MRDTF reported a total of \$4.24 million in revenue for this analysis, including from HIDTA, hard funding contributions, and JAG, which comprised \$1.47 million, or 34.67 percent of all documented financial inputs.

MRDTF	JAG Funding	Local match	Other revenue	Hard funded - local agencies contribution	HIDTA	Total
Total	\$1,470,200	\$1,721,502	\$21,799	\$239,483	\$787,555	\$4,240,539
Percent	34.67	40.60	0.51	5.65	18.57	100.00

FY	Total cost per arrest	Total cost per adjudication
11	\$6,026.13	\$5,871.62
12	\$6,026.22	\$6,107.65
13	\$5,625.25	\$5,580.95
14	\$4,100.26	\$5,354.82
15	\$6,433.90	\$8,966.39


MRDTF's estimated hourly pay rate applied to the performance period totaled \$33.21 per hour including fringe. Loaded resource units, those that included pay and fringe, hard funding, HIDTA, and travel, operational and administrative expenses totaled between \$42.07 an hour in FY12 and \$63.39 in FY15, when MRDTF received a boost in JAG funding to support Helena and Gallatin County operations.

MRDTF during the performance period made at least 734 arrests. In light of the 35 percent JAG funding contribution, the Byrne Grant may be seen as primarily responsible for 254 arrests during the performance period. The JAG portion of MRDTF's overall per-arrest arrest cost is itemized by fiscal year in the graph below. The estimated average JAG cost per adjudication for the performance period was \$2,211.



MBCC data and MTIBRS reports indicate that MRDTF saw a significant decline in distribution cases between 2011 and 2015. MBCC data from the period between 2011 and 2013 indicates that nearly 50 percent of all cases filed during that time involved distribution or manufacture. MTIBRS for 2014 and 2015, however, shows distribution comprising .38 percent of all cases and

production/manufacture at .95 percent. As noted in the NWMDTF profile preceding this one, the transition to MTIBRS in 2013 should be kept in mind when evaluating the data.



The more nuanced picture created by MTIBRS shows that crimes against persons and crimes against property comprised more than 10 percent of all MJDTF cases. A Level 4 search of offenses related to arrests on MTIBRS indicates that crimes policed by MRDTF in FY14 and FY15 included partner family member assault, shoplifting, burglary, and revocation of a suspended or deferred sentence. Group B offenses cited included probation violation, obstructing a peace officer, under age tobacco consumption, and endangering the welfare of children.


All offenses FY2014 FY2015	Group B	Paraphernalia	Fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs	Distribution total number charges across task force	Possession/ possession with intent total	Production/ manufacture	Weapon	Endangering the children (Group B)	Against property	Against persons	Total
MRDTF	108	156	1	2	195	5	3	3	32	22	527
Percent	20.49	29.60	0.19	0.38	37.00	0.95	0.57	0.57	6.07	4.17	100

Of MRDTF offenses by primary classification, between FY11 and FY13:⁸

- 42.09 percent were for possession or possession with intent
- 41.63 percent were for distribution
- 7.91 percent were for production or manufacture
- 8.37 were classified as “other”

Reporting standards between FY11 and FY13 allow for an examination of the types of drugs involved with each arrest. During that period:

- Marijuana was implicated in MRDTF arrests 38.72 percent of the time.
- Meth constituted the second most frequently involved drug in an arrest, at 21.38 percent. Narcotics was the third most prevalent substance, at 20.19 percent.



Between fiscal years 2014 and 2015, MTIBRS offers a more in-depth perspective of all offenses alleged of task force targets, rather than solely classifications by primary offense. During those years:


- Possession and possession with intent comprised 37 percent of all offenses
- Charges related to drug paraphernalia totaled 29.6 percent
- Group B offenses summed to 20.49 percent
- Crimes against persons comprised 4.17 percent
- Distribution charges reflected .38 percent of those filed
- Crimes against property crimes summed to 6.07 percent

⁸ Total charges reflect two more than those tallied in the number of arrests for FY11-FY13.

There was a decrease in the number of cases sent for adjudication between FY14 and FY15, from 134 in FY14 to 95 the next year. MRDTF staff says the change resulted from a new focus on federal prosecutions, such as those warranting conspiracy and trafficking prosecutions. Like other MJDTF commanders interviewed for this analysis, MRDTF Commander Ryan Stratman notes that existing reporting mechanisms fail to capture some of the task force's biggest victories, collaborations that lead to federal prosecutions.

Eastern Montana Drug Task Force (EMDTF)

The Eastern Montana Drug Task Force (EMDTF) is comprised of Garfield, Rosebud, Treasure, McCone, Dawson, Wibaux, Prairie, Custer, Powder River, Fallon and Carter counties. Member agencies include the Custer County Sheriff's Department, the Miles City Police Department, the Rosebud County Sheriff's Office, and the Montana Department of Justice – Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). The EMDTF jurisdictional area encompasses 30,345 square miles, supporting approximately 42,409 people, with median household incomes of \$45,435. DCI manages JAG funds on behalf of MBCC.



JAG funding comprised 25.86 percent of all EMDTF revenue during the FY11-FY15 performance period. The JAG funded-portion of EMDTF's average cost per adjudication was \$2,094 for the performance period.

EMDTF staff reports that the task force did not upload all cases into MTIBRS until mid 2015.

EMDTF	Arrests total across DTF	DTF Incidents	DTF reported cases to prosecution
FY11	32	79	31
FY12	41	97	41
FY13	44	102	48
FY14	59	74	46
FY15	23	37	50
Grand Total	199	389	216

This analysis, therefore, relies on EMDTF self-reported arrest information when possible. That data indicate there were 216 individuals taken into custody by participating EMDTF law enforcement agencies during the reporting period. Taking a 25.86 percent JAG-funding ratio, which represents the amount of JAG funding to EMDTF as a proportion of overall revenue documented for this analysis, and applying it to the number of self-reported cases for prosecution indicates

that 56 EMDTF cases sent to prosecutors for adjudication between FY11 and FY15 were supported by JAG.


Between FY11 and FY13:

- Possession and possession with intent comprised 64.96 percent of all arrests by primary offense
- Distribution totaled 19.66 percent of arrests by primary offense
- Arrests by primary offense classified as “other” summed to 10.26 percent of those made
- Production and manufacture totaled 5.13 percent of arrests by primary offense
- Marijuana involved in the largest proportion of EMDTF arrests, at 44.9 percent
- Meth was listed as the drug involved with 31.36 percent of arrests by primary offense
- Narcotics were involved in 14.41 percent of the cases filed
- Two drugs were involved in nearly 7 percent of all cases
- Less than 3 percent of arrests were for cocaine, three or more drugs, and unknown substances

The chart below presents a breakdown from MTIBRS of the crimes reported by EMDTF to MTIBRS for FY14 and FY15.

FY14- FY15	Group B	Possession /possession with intent	Distribution	Paraphernalia	Clandestine Lab/	Production/ manufacture	Endangering children (Group B) (2011) nonviolent	Property	Person	Total
EMDTF	45	33	3	25	2	1	2	13	8	132
Percent	34.09	25	2.27	18.94	1.52	0.76	1.52	9.85	6.06	100

As the graph below portraying EMDTF harm scores indicates, the evidence suggests the task force filed progressively fewer distribution charges as a percentage of overall offenses throughout the performance period.



When asked about such findings, EMDTF Commander Jeff Faycosh said the data presented on MTIBRS is not reflective of life on the ground because the task force did not become fully compliant with the MTIBRS system until FY15.

The reporting challenges are evident in a discrepancy between MTIBRS drug endangered children intervention reports and

data produced by EMDTF reflective of that work. Rather than two endangered children charges reflected on MTIBRS for FY14 and 15, EMDTF records provided by Faycosh show 12 drug endangered children cases involving 29 children in that two-year period. Such discrepancies and their implications to monetization are discussed in the “Net costs and benefits: Putting it all together” section of this document.

EMDTF self-reported drug-endangered children cases

Fiscal year	Time range	Total DEC cases	Total children
2011	07/10/10 - 06/30/11	12	19
2012	07/01/11 – 06/30/12	20	28
2013	07/01/12 – 06/30/13	15	24
2014	07/01/13 – 06/30/14	9	26
2015	07/01/14 – 06/30/15	3	3


Southwest Montana Drug Task Force (SWMDTF)

The Southwest Montana Drug Task Force (SWMDTF) in FY 15 was comprised of Silver Bow, Beaverhead, Anaconda Deer Lodge, Granite, Jefferson, Madison, and Powell counties. Member agencies include the Madison County Sheriff’s Department and the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). The SWMDTF jurisdictional area encompasses 16,293 square miles and its area in FY 15 housed roughly 82,888 people. The jurisdiction’s median income during the five-year performance period totaled \$44,894.86.

The Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation supervises SWMDTF operations. The task force Commander Shane Hight is based out of Butte. Hight’s salary and fringe are supported by DCI, as is a full-time administrative support position and a part-time supervisor employed by DCI, who is classified for this analysis as a .1FTE. In addition to Butte operations, officers during the performance period operated out of Madison and Anaconda-Deer Lodge counties.

SWMDTF	Other revenue	Local match	DCI/FBI/Hard funded	JAG	Total
Grand Total	\$739	\$570,594	\$583,050	\$581,004	\$1,735,387
Percent	0.04	32.88	33.60	33.48	100.00

JAG funding reflected 33.48 percent of all documented. Based on that percentage, the Byrne Grant may be considered the primary funding source in 38 cases sent to adjudication during the five-year performance period.




Largely because of a decline in the number of self-reported cases sent for adjudication, from 25 in FY13 to two in FY13, SWMDTF had the highest per-adjudication average cost during the performance period of any other JAG task force in Montana, at \$14,790.

SWMDTF	Incidents	Arrests	DTF reported cases to prosecution
FY11	128	38	53
FY12	93	41	26
FY13	105	24	25
FY14	28	15	2
FY15	28	12	8
Grand Total	382	130	114

SWMDTF Commander Hight said during a July 13 interview with CRG that MTIBRS arrest numbers used for this analysis appear low, especially fiscal year 13 data. He attributed the discrepancy to two primary factors. The first is the task force's transition to MTIBRS.

Hight indicated that SWMDTF did not complete that transition until sometime in 2015. The second factor, Hight said, may be attributed to a lack of reporting mechanisms for tracking federal charges filed as a result of collaborative efforts.



As indicated in the graph to the left, while SWMDTF had the highest cost per adjudication during the performance period, it also garnered the highest proportion of distribution charges of any JAG-supported task force in the state.

Between FY11 and FY13, SWMDTF arrests classified by primary offense indicate:

- Forty one and half percent of arrests by primary offense were for distribution
- Arrests for possession and possession with intent totaled 33.01 percent
- Other comprised 16.5 percent of arrests by primary offense
- Production and manufacture related offenses were related to 8.74 percent of arrests
- SWMDTF had a higher proportion of narcotics related arrest than any other MJDTF. In fact, it was the only JAG supported task force to have a drug other than marijuana be the most frequently cited

Between FY14 and FY15, MTIBRS data shows:

- Paraphernalia related charges comprised more than any other, at 36.84 percent of overall offenses
- Possession constituted the second most common offense, at 31.58 percent of offenses documented


- Distribution, production and weapons violations respectively each reflected 5.26 percent of all offenses during the FY14 and FY15 reporting period

West Central Montana Drug Task Force (WCMDTF)

The West Central Montana Drug Task Force (WCMDTF) is comprised of Missoula, Ravalli, Mineral and Lake counties as well as the Flathead Tribal Police Department. Member agencies during the performance period examined in this analysis included the Missoula County Attorney's Office, the Ravalli County Sheriff's Office, and the Mineral County Sheriff's Office. The task force's jurisdictional area encompasses 7,693 square miles and supports a population of approximately 187,707 people. During the performance period, the median household income in the WCMDTF jurisdiction was \$40,102. The Missoula County Sheriff's Office oversees WCMDTF JAG operations.

JAG funding for WCMDTF totaled \$634,351 during the performance period, comprising 26 percent of all documentable revenue, not including forfeiture, which for the purposes of this analysis is considered a cost offset. Reported forfeiture revenue for the entire performance period totaled \$210,974

An application of the JAG funding overlay to WCMDTF reports, which show it sent 2,223 cases to prosecutors, suggests that 578 of all WCMDTF cases sent for adjudication during the performance period could be attributed to JAG funding.⁹



Municipal Court by WCMDTF and the comparably low cost of sending a case to adjudication

⁹ This sum imputes the number of cases to prosecutors for FY15. WCMDTF provided a significant amount of self-reported data. However, it did not have the number of cases to prosecutors for FY15. As such, researchers computed the average number of cases to adjudication of all cases initiated between FY11 and FY14 and imputed an estimated number for FY15. WCMDTF reported 3,348 cases opened in that four-year span, not including drugs or paraphernalia reported lost or found. Of the 3,348 cases, 1,747 were sent for prosecution, totaling a 52.18 case-to-prosecution rate. Applying that rate to the 888 cases opened in FY15 produced an estimate of 492 cases that would have been sent to prosecutors in 2015.


suggests that a sizeable portion of task force activity may be attributed to undetected support through WCMDTF's partnership with the City of Missoula Police Department. HIDTA and JAG outputs are reported together in the MTIBRS system, as was data provided by WCMDTF, making it likely that WCMDTF's low-cost productivity may be attributed to the unidentified support. The chart below illustrates funding streams documented for this analysis.

WCMDTF	DCI/FBI/Hard funded	Local match	HIDTA	JAG	Total
Grand Total	\$524,635	\$879,184	\$421,594	\$634,351	\$2,459,764
Percent	21.33	35.74	17.14	25.79	100

The average hourly rate documented for WCMDTF law enforcement, including with fringe, for the performance period was \$40.21 per hour. In FY11 WCMDTF employed 2.17 law enforcement officers, two at the Missoula County Sheriff's Office and a part-time investigator for the Flathead Indian Reservation Tribal Police.¹⁰ The tribal investigator position was eliminated in FY14 and FY15.


Between FY11 and FY14, juvenile cases comprised 17.96 percent of the total number sent for adjudication by WCMDTF (335 of 1,865). Fifty one percent of WCMDTF cases during that period were sent to Missoula Municipal Court, which only adjudicates misdemeanors. That means that at least half of all charges filed by WCMDTF were misdemeanors; 28 percent of all cases documented were referred to county prosecutors. The remainder were referred for federal prosecution.

With local matching funds, WCMDTF in FY11 allocated \$64,688 to support a prosecutor with the Missoula County Attorney's Office and \$18,112 for a paralegal. In FY12 funding through the JAG program for Missoula County prosecutorial staff declined to \$50,815, staying at that level for FY13. The prosecutor positions were no longer funded in FY14 and FY15.



While WCMDTF had the lowest cost-per-case-to-adjudication expense during the performance period, it also garnered the highest per arrest possession harm score, meaning possession constituted a larger proportion of overall charges filed than the other JAG funded task forces. Similarly, WCMDTF's per-arrest distribution harm score was lower than any other task force evaluated for this analysis.

¹⁰ Sub-grant narratives, interviews with WCMDTF.



For WCMDTF between FY11 and FY13:

- Possession and possession with intent comprised 90.68 percent of all arrests classified by primary offense
- Distribution totaled 4.57 percent of all arrests by primary offense
- Charges classified as “Other” amounted to 2.8 percent of arrest classifications
- Production and manufacture totaled 1.95 percent of all arrests by primary offense

Between fiscal years 14 and 15, MTIBRS shows:


- Possession and possession with intent, in addition to possession of drug paraphernalia charges, constituted 56.13 percent of all offenses
- Group B offenses totaled 24.63 percent of charges
- Crimes against property amounted to 10.5 percent of offenses
- Crimes against persons constituted 4.13 percent of charges
- Distribution totaled 2 percent of offenses
- Weapons charges amounted to .63 percent of charges filed
- Child endangerment totaled .13 percent of all charges
- Drug production and manufacture reflected .13 percent of offenses

Tri-Agency Task Force (TATF)

The Tri-Agency Task Force (TATF) in 2015 was comprised of Hill, Blaine, Phillips, Daniels, Sheridan, Liberty, and Valley counties. Member agencies also included the Fort Belknap and Rocky Boy’s Indian reservations and the City of Havre. The TATF jurisdictional area during the performance period housed nearly 30,000 people. The median annual income averaged among the seven task force counties during the performance period was \$44,894. The Havre City Police Department receives JAG funds from MBCC.

TATF along with other Montana law enforcement agencies in fiscal year 15 ended a federal investigation on the Rocky Boy and Fort Belknap Indian reservations, and also Havre, Butte, and Great Falls, called the “Hi-line Crystal Highway” that led to 17 federal indictments. According to performance report data, all arrestees pleaded or were found guilty.

JAG contributed an estimated 52 percent to TTF operations during the performance period, during which 630 arrests were reported through MBCC and MTIBRS. In light of the JAG funding overlay, the Byrne Grant may be seen as primarily responsible for 325 arrests. Data reported from TATF to CRG for this analysis, meanwhile, indicates JAG funding was responsible for sending 295 cases of the 567 filed to adjudication.



TATF during the performance period had an average cost per case to adjudication of \$1,365.

The hourly rate of pay for a TATF officer was calculated to be \$28.70, including fringe. (Based on analyses of budget narratives submitted to MBCC and sub-

grant history reports generated by MBCC.) Operational expenses were included in the loaded resource units, which ranged from a low hourly cost of \$39.33 in FY12 to a high of \$53.39 in FY14.

The number of TATF self-reported cases to adjudication totaled 542 for the performance period. Coupled with the JAG funding portion of overall revenue, 51.52 percent, JAG may be considered responsible for sending 279 TATF cases to prosecutors.

As the chart below indicates, TATF ceased receiving funding from the Federal Bureau of Investigation after 2011. That contribution is reflected in the “other” category. The task force received an increase in funding in FY12 and also in FY15, with the addition of Valley County and an associated detective in Glasgow.

Despite a decline in overall funding in FY13, marking a decrease of 22 percent from FY12, the task force increased the number of cases it sent to adjudication by 57 percent, from 87 in

TATF	Local match	DCI/FBI/Hard funded from local agencies contribution	Other revenue	JAG Funding	Total
FY11	\$79,830		\$55,250	\$186,270	\$321,350
FY12	\$151,873	\$3,676		\$183,490	\$339,038
FY13	\$77,354	\$69,414		\$97,647	\$244,415
FY14	\$80,270	\$8,573	\$9,085	\$97,647	\$195,576
FY15	\$157,830	\$8,690		\$180,884	\$347,403
Total	\$547,157	\$90,353	\$64,335	\$745,937	\$1,447,782
Percent	37.79	6.24	4.44	51.52	100

fiscal year 12 to 137 in FY13.

Within the TATF jurisdiction between FY11 and FY12:


- 47.16 percent of arrests by primary offense were related to possession
- 38.43 percent of arrests by primary offense were for distribution
- 10.49 percent of arrests by primary offense were classified as “other”
- 3.93 percent of arrests by primary offenses were for production or manufacture

TATF	DTF reported cases to prosecution	Arrests	Incidents
FY11	101	70	172
FY12	87	82	188
FY13	126	76	206
FY14	126	196	191
FY15	116	206	239
Total	542	630	996

In FY14 and FY15:

- Paraphernalia constituted the most frequently cited offense, at 31.13 percent
- Group B charges were the second most frequently cited violation, at 30.76 percent
- Possession and possession with intent comprised 23.04 percent of all charges
- Crimes against persons totaled 4.29 percent of all offenses
- Crimes against property comprised 3.92 percent
- Distribution charges summed to 3.68 percent
- Group B endangering the welfare of children totaled .12 percent

While the number of arrests increased, it appears from MTIBRS and MBCC data that the quality of arrests declined. As illustrated in the graph “TATF Harm Scores,” the task force’s per-arrest distribution harm score declined from a high of 3.78 in FY12 to .22 in FY14 to 1.04 in FY15. That decline indicates that fewer individuals were detained for distribution as a percentage of total arrests.



TATF	Per-arrest possession harm score	Per-arrest distribution harm score	Per-arrest production harm score
FY11	1.608429	3.685714	0.371571
FY12	1.830732	3.77561	0.105732
FY13	2.469079	2.489474	0.570395
FY14	2.063724	0.219388	0.044235
FY15	1.842087	1.043689	0.042087

Identification of program outputs

This report draws from the MJDTF mission statement and JAG crime-fighting directives to identify four desired task force cost objectives. (See page 11 for a discussion about how cost objectives were identified). The four cost objectives serve as a means for classifying performance and also a platform for monetizing outputs. Because of the propensity for addiction to be carried forward to the next generation (Nurco et al.1999), the number of endangered children interventions conducted is categorized under the objective, “Reducing the supply and demand of dangerous drugs,” for instance. The number of arrests for crimes against property, meanwhile, is classified under Objective 1, to “Decrease Drug Related Crime.”

Cohen in 2009 posited that adult career offenders commit 10.6 crimes per year at the height of their productivity, spanning roughly six years. In his examination of data compiled from offenders in Washington D.C., Detroit, and state prisons in California, Michigan, and Texas, Cohen found that the average 26 year old in a cohort of 6,157 Philadelphia offenders had committed between 41 and 47.8 offenses preceding the incarceration. According to Cohen’s analysis, only roughly 13 percent of the overall offenses committed by this high-risk subgroup involved a police intervention.

Such findings indicate that the acts of career criminals more often than not go undetected. Cohen’s (2009) estimates of the external economic costs incurred by a career offender would be \$1.98 million in 2017 dollars. DeLisi and Gatling’s 2003 work, meanwhile, pegged the costs incurred by a lifetime offender at what would be \$1.55 million today. Translated for the purposes of this analysis, an argument can be made that intervening in a career criminal’s stands to significantly curb costs to victims, institutions, and society.

There are challenges associated with applying such findings here, however. Principal among them are data limitations. In FY14 and FY15, it is possible through MTIBRS to identify whether an alleged offender was taken into custody on a warrant or without a previous incident report. But detailed knowledge of at what point in the crime cycle an arrest was made, whether a victimization was prevented, for example, is lacking, and with it the possibility of directly itemizing cost savings that may have resulted from a JAG task force intervention. Further confounding the effort to quantify the value of MJDTF interventions is the absence of comprehensive offender information regarding task force targets.

Armed with data on specific offenders, it would be possible to estimate the value of intervening in offender crime trajectories. Absent this, and seeking strategies capable of putting a monetary

value to MJDTF outputs, CRG provided estimates of the economic value that would have been provided to victims had one crime been interrupted. This strategy constitutes a means for estimating the potential economic value inherent to MJDTF interventions. It is limited, however, in that this approach presents only hypothetical scenarios based on the best estimates of harm that *may* have been averted to victims. Because of the uncertain nature of this procedure, only potential savings accrued to crime victims is calculated. The overall institutional and societal benefits that could be attributed to MJDTF work, incarcerating chronic offenders and ensuring they no longer can engage in criminal activity, for instance, is not included in calculations used to estimate benefits.

Regarding the monetization of drug offenses, a review of the academic literature fails to produce a direct monetary benefit for incarcerating individuals for possession or sale of narcotics.

Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests targeting drug offenders who engage in no other criminal behaviors beyond narcotic consumption does not constitute a cost-effective strategy for crime prevention. (Benson 2008; Benson et al. 1992; Sollars 1992; Kuzeimko and Levitt 2004) That perspective, coupled with the lack of direct monetary damage incurred to victims related to the transfer of drugs absent violence, prompted a decision to assign no victim harm value to possession, manufacture, and distribution offenses.

In the following section, MTIBRS and MBCC data was called upon to explore MJDTF outputs. A brief discussion about the monetary value of MJDTF work is provided below, with a more detailed exploration of task force financial impacts included in the “Putting it all together: Net costs and benefits section” of this document.

Objective 1: Decrease drug-related crime

There is a debate in the criminological literature regarding the extent to which drug use and crime are linked. Often cited in this debate is the 2004 Bureau of Justice (BJS) Statistics Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, which found that 17 percent of state prisoners committed their crime to obtain money for drugs. BJS findings (2002) also show that roughly a quarter of convicted property and drug offenders in local jails in 2002 committed their crimes to get money for drugs. Respected thinkers in the criminology domain hold that there is a direct link between heavy drug use and crime. (Goldstein 1985; Chaiken and Chaiken 1982).

While data show that drug users often commit crime, the issue of causation, whether drug use causes unlawful behavior, constitutes the subject of multiple academic papers. There is one school of thought that argues (Benson and Rasmussen 1996; Kim (1993) that there are two distinct groups of drug users, the largest of which commits no crime beyond that involved with narcotics. Kim et al. (1993) specifically found through a review of the criminal records belonging to nearly 46,000 individuals arrested in Florida in 1987 for drug crimes that 76 percent had no previous arrests for violent felony crimes, more than 80 percent had no burglary or grand larceny arrests, and more than 90 percent had not been arrested for property theft. (Kim et al. 1993 p. 181). Langan and Cuniff (1992), meanwhile, found that felony drug offenders released from prison and rearrested for another offense were most frequently detained for another drug offense, rather than a property crime or one associated with violence.

Benson and Rasmussen (1996) posit that criminal behavior most often precedes drug use and it is through the criminal subculture that individuals become habituated to narcotics. “Of course, if the individual later becomes addicted, his or her preferences may change and at that point the ‘drugs-cause-crime’ relationship might well come into play.” (Benson and Rasmussen 1996, Sect. 3).

For this analysis, the extent to which MJDTFs activities affect drug-related crime is measured in three metrics, property offense rates, Group B offenses, and arrest quality scores. (Persons crime and narcotic-related violence fall under Objective 3: Address Narcotic Related Violence).

Objective 1: Metric 1

Crimes against property

Calculations for this analysis suggest that 291 MJDTF-involved property crimes occurred between FY11 and FY15. MTIBRS data indicates that the four most frequently cited crimes against property were for theft, shoplifting, criminal mischief, burglary, and robbery.

Fifty percent of property offenses were related to theft and shoplifting, or an estimated 146 arrests related to such crimes between FY11 and FY15. Misdemeanor criminal mischief, which involves the intentional destruction or tampering of property, was the third most commonly cited charge, constituting 14 percent of those reported to MTIBRS in FY14 and FY15. Applying that percentage to the performance period, results in an estimate of 41 arrests related to such offenses during the reporting period. At 13 percent, burglary was the fourth most frequently involved crime against property, yielding an estimated 38 offenses. Robbery was involved in 7 percent of all MJDTF property crime related arrests between 2014 and 2015, or an estimated 20 arrests for the performance period. Other crimes against property included counterfeiting, embezzlement, credit card fraud, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and pickpocketing.

The total potential benefit in MJDTF work policing property crimes yielded a potential value of \$425,028, with the JAG portion of that benefit \$ \$144,509. (More on how these sums were calculated can be found in the “Putting it all together: Net costs and benefits” section of this document.

Objective 1: Metric 2

Group B offenses

Group B offenses include those associated with writing bad checks, liquor law violations, disorderly conduct, and nonviolent family offenses. This offenses category includes the crime of misdemeanor endangering the welfare of children, which has been removed from this metric to be discussed in Objective 4, to “Reduce the supply and demand of dangerous drugs.” It is estimated that MJDTFs made 670 Group B arrests during the performance period.

While recent crime costing literature is tough to find, estimates of the societal, institutional, and victim costs associated with misdemeanor crimes are even more sparse. Aos et al.’s (2001) estimates of the total costs associated with policing and adjudicating misdemeanor crimes translated to 2017 currency would yield a total cost of \$1,765 resulting from the typical misdemeanor offense in Washington State. The Santa Fe Community Foundation’s analysis of opiate crime in that city, meanwhile, found while making a “rough estimate” that the average

costs of booking 100 such defendants for a range of misdemeanor offenses, including property crimes and paraphernalia related charges between 2010 and 2012 totaled \$225 per offender. (Rand 2013). An analysis of Virginia Adult Drug Treatment Courts found the average arrest and adjudication costs for a control group totaled \$124 in 2012, a sum that would amount to \$132 today. (Cheesman et al. 2012). Aos et al.'s (2006) estimated costs of making a misdemeanor arrest in Washington State meanwhile would sum to \$388 in 2017.

Those numbers may be contrasted with the total costs associated with one JAG misdemeanor arrest. The average cost of a Montana Byrne Grant supported MJDTF arrest during the performance period totaled \$3,510 prior to adjudication and punitive sanctions, with the JAG portion of that costs being \$1,193. While misdemeanor cases may be filed against an offender also subject to felony charges, the cost comparisons itemized above suggest that the total expenses associated with JAG officers making misdemeanor arrests does not constitute the best use of Byrne Grant resources. With that said, it is also important to note that the task force with the highest proportion of misdemeanor arrests, WCMDTF, came in at the low end of the cost spectrum, averaging \$289.66 in JAG supported costs per case to adjudication for the five-year study period.


Objective 1: Metric 3

Arrest quality scores

Statutory sentencing directives were used to create an index capable of measuring through objective means the harm incurred by specific types of crimes. (Sherman 2013; Applied Research Services 2014). Penalties incurred by offenders sentenced on minor marijuana possession charges, for example, versus distribution of dangerous drugs were assigned a score based on sentencing guidelines. Crimes with longer maximum jail or prison sentences received higher scores, as did those offenses carrying relatively higher fine amounts. On the MJDTF Harm Index, the highest ranked drug offenses include operation of a clandestine laboratory, with a harm score of 13, criminal advertisement of an imitation dangerous drug, assigned a harm score of 11, and production or manufacture of dangerous drugs, which earned an 8.6. Drug possession garnered a harm score of 4.17 and felony criminal child endangerment a 10. Narcotic paraphernalia charges received a score of 2.

MJDTF index scores are based on MBCC and MTIBRS reporting and provided here for all task forces. A more detailed conversation about individual task force harm scores is discussed in the "Task force profiles" section of this document.

As indicated in the graph below, WCMDTF and EMDTF had the highest possession harm scores, meaning they arrested more individuals for possession-related offenses as a percentage of their overall arrests than any other task forces. According to MBCC reports, 90.68 percent of primary charges by arrest for WCMDTF in FY11-FY13 were for possession and possession with intent; 4.57 percent were for distribution, and 1.95 percent for manufacture.



SWMDTF has the highest per-arrest distribution score, meaning it arrests more individuals for distribution as a percentage of overall arrests than any other task force, while detaining a fewer number of people for possession related offenses.

SWMDTF reported 41.5 percent of its arrests were for distribution, and 8.74 percent were for production and manufacture.

In light of

SWMDTF comparably high quality arrests, it should be noted that the task force has the highest average JAG cost per case to adjudication among all MJDTFs. SWMDTF's JAG-funded arrest costs averaged \$14,790 for the performance period. WCMDTF had the lowest JAG per-case-to-adjudication cost, averaging \$290 between FY11 and FY15.

Objective 2: Disrupt and dismantle entities that manufacture, sell, and traffic in unlawful narcotics

Objective 2 is measured in four metrics. The first indicator comes from arrest data detailing the number of individuals arrested for manufacture, sale, and distribution. The second is cash forfeited to MJDTFs. The third metric is the number of gangs and drug trafficking organizations disrupted and dismantled. Law enforcement officer training hours and training logged by individuals outside of MJDTFs constitutes the fourth metric.

Objective 2: Metric 1

Arrests for manufacture, sale, and distribution

Drug task forces operate on principles of impulse-response analysis. Interdiction activities serve as the impulse, which should trigger fluctuations in drug prices, considered the response. (National Resource Council (NRC)). The idea is that interventions occur and the consequences

can be observed. Traditional economic analysis predicts that if interdiction and domestic enforcement succeed in reducing the supply of drugs, then drug prices will rise, and consumption will fall (NRC P. 144).” This supply and demand model of drug policing is consistent with the economic approach, which is premised on the idea that both drug traffickers and drug users are rational actors. (NRC 2001).

Arrest data compiled for this analysis reflective of all MJDTF activity indicates:

- Between fiscal years 2011 and 2013, distribution totaled 17.14 percent of arrests categorized by primary offense.
- Between fiscal years 2011 and 2013, production and manufacture constituted 4.13 percent of arrests classified by primary offense.
- In fiscal years 2014 and 2015, distribution constituted 2.4 percent of all charges¹¹
- In fiscal years FY14 and FY15, production or manufacture totaled .49 percent of all charges.

Objective 2: Metric 2

Cash forfeiture sums

Forfeiture may be used for equipment purchases, extraordinary costs, such as for recording devices and cameras, and also capital expenses. Forfeiture revenue may also be used to supplement labor expenses. From the economic perspective, forfeiture is considered transfer payment, meaning that money is exchanged but not goods or services. “To the economy as a whole, (transfer payments) are neither costs nor benefits, only part of the pattern of distributing the aggregate product.” (Mishan 1972). For this reason, forfeiture is not counted in the benefits column of the economic analysis.

Instead, forfeiture is conceptualized as a deterrent against criminal behavior. (Bowles et al. 2000). Because forfeiture sums included here do not include proceeds generated by property seizure, and therefore should be considered as conservative estimates.

Financial records compiled for this evaluation show:¹²

- MJDTFs during the five-year performance period received \$2.832 million in forfeiture proceeds, or nearly 18 percent of all revenue
- NWMDTF yielded more in forfeiture than any other task force, \$1.188 million
- MRDTF generated the second largest forfeiture sum for the performance period, \$1.177 million
- WCMDTF, at \$210,974, reported the third highest amount of forfeiture throughout the five-year evaluation window

¹² Cash forfeiture sums reported in annual sub-grant history reports to MBCC and, in the case of WCMDTF, quarterly narratives

All MJDTF	Forfeiture revenue
BMRDTF	\$3,069.89
EMDTF	\$38,500.17
MRDTF	\$1,176,895.87
NWMDTF	\$1,187,875.84
SWMDTF	\$18,864.16
TATF	\$196,080.60
WCMDTF	\$210,973.74
Total	\$2,832,260.27

It's notable that SWMDTF reports the least amount of forfeiture revenue and the highest per-adjudication cost of any task force. A review of SWMDTF's JAG and local match spending shows the task force dedicated a greater proportion of its funding to operational expenses than did the other task forces (38 percent). Such accounts of SWMDTF's financial history suggests that SWMDTF, with less forfeiture revenue than the other task forces, was comparably more reliant on grant-related support.

When evaluating future funding levels for MJDTFs, policymakers should contemplate the effect a 2015 change to

Montana's forfeiture law, which now mandates a criminal conviction occur prior to seizure. MJDTF commanders report the new requirement is making it more difficult to engage in forfeiture. The significant role forfeiture played in offsetting operational and capital expenditures during the performance period suggests that securing funding for those investments will present challenges in the wake of this statutory change.

Objective 2: Metric 3

Gangs and drug trafficking organizations disrupted

Objective 2: Metric 3 is representative of core MJDTF directives articulated in the mission statement, specifically, "to identify, target, and address those involved in drug trafficking, manufacturing, and/or violence."

Metrics used to measure this output category include:¹³

- The number of drug trafficking or other entrepreneurial gangs disrupted
- The number of drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and money laundering organizations dismantled
- The number of drug trafficking organizations disrupted

Gangs disrupted or dismantled FY11-FY15	Disrupted trafficking or other entrepreneurial gangs	Drug trafficking organizations, gangs, money laundering orgs dismantled	Drug trafficking organizations disrupted during the reporting period	Total
FY11	0	14	16	30
FY12	3	8	26	37
FY13	3	7	18	28
FY14	1	11	9	21
FY15	0	6	8	14
Grand Total	7	46	77	130

¹³ All data presented in the gangs disrupted section is compiled from quarterly performance narratives and aggregated by fiscal year.

As detailed in the chart above, MJDTFs reported the lowest number of drug trafficking, organizations and gangs disrupted in FY15. There were 14 reported organized entities disrupted that year, down from a high of 37 in FY12. FY12 also marked the high point in JAG funding between FY11 and FY15. The “gangs disrupted” metrics, which are not subject to inconsistencies related to the transition to MTIBRS, indicates task forces in FY 15 did not perform this central element of their mission as successfully as in the earlier years of the performance period.

Objective 2: Metric 4

Internal and external training hours

This metric is measured in two parts:

- Objective 2: Metric 4 (a) - Training hours received by MJDTF officers
- Objective 2: Metric 4 (b) - Training hours provided to individuals outside of MJDTF organizations

Objective 2: Metric 4 (a) - Training hours provided to individuals outside of the organization

Performance reports from FY13 and FY14 indicate that 1,349 individuals from outside of JAG affiliated organizations were trained by officers supported by the Byrne Grant. Those sums show that a total of .76 hours of training per person outside of the organization was provided for that two-year period.

Imputing calculations based on expenditures between 2012 and 2014 to the remaining three years of the performance period produces an estimate of 391.4 hours of training provided to individuals outside of the organization annually. For the five-year period an estimated total of 1,957 hours of training would be provided to individuals outside of the organization.

Training is typically provided at no cost to outside law enforcement agencies, making monetization of this service an inexact enterprise. To provide an estimate of the value associated with such efforts, CRG took the average salary of a law enforcement officer including fringe compiled from a review of MJDTF records, \$30.91, and multiplied it by the hours of training provided to individuals outside of MJDTF organizations. This calculation produced an estimate of the value of MJDTF training to individuals outside of the organization of \$60,491. With the 34 percent JAG funding overlay, the value of individuals trained from outside of the organization is estimated to be \$20,566.94.

Objective 2: Metric 4 (b) Training hours received by MJDTF officers

Between fiscal years 2012 and 2014, 171 JAG affiliated law enforcement agency staffers received 3,418 hours of training on drug interdiction, gang policing, and other MJDTF-related endeavors. The 2012 – 2014 period is the only one in which MJDTFs reported hours invested in training alongside individuals trained. Metrics provided in that two-year period, therefore, serve as the basis for calculating the number of training hours received per person throughout the performance period.

Based on data indicating that 171 law enforcement personnel received a total of 3,418 hours of training between 2012 and 2014, it was estimated that a FTE receives an average of 20 hours of training annually. Performance reports show that 654 individuals were trained between 2010 and 2012. In fiscal years 13, 14, and 15, the quarterly performance submissions show 4,480 hours total invested in training, with 3,418 of those hours dedicated to law enforcement.

The benefits associated with providing task forces comprehensive training on drug interdiction is to produce officers who are more capable of better assembling, preserving, and presenting evidence (Rhodes 2009). The value of training for JAG officers is that it increases the likelihood of conviction and also prison sentences, thereby more effectively disrupting and dismantling entities that traffic, manufacture, and sell contraband. The increased training should be reflected in case quality generated by task forces. As such, the value of outputs produced through increased MJDTF training are explored in sections of this report on arrest quality and outcomes.

Objective 2: Metric 5

Information sharing and collaboration

The academic literature exploring the efficacy of the multijurisdictional nature of task forces highlights collaboration as among their greatest values. (Coldren et al. 1993 and Smith et al. 2000). In Montana, tribal, local, state, and federal agencies come together with JAG support to streamline communication. Functionally, too, there are distinct benefits to be gained from bringing together representatives from across the criminal justice system, including prosecutors who routinely participate in drug task force activities. (In the context of this analysis, the prosecutorial partnership is reflected most in the JAG contribution to a deputy county attorney and associated administrative staff in WCMDTF during fiscal years 2011 through 2013).

Similarly, a primary rationale behind MJDTF operations is that they improve information sharing across agency and jurisdictional boundaries (Rhodes et al. 2009; Mazerolle et al. 2007; Frantzan in 2009; Levine and Martin 1992). Montana quarterly performance reports only sporadically documented information sharing metrics during the performance period, however. For example, the number of weapons traced through the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Explosives was only chronicled for a portion of the performance period. Beyond textual accounts of intelligence sharing offered in performance reports and information offered by MJDTF commanders during interviews for this inquiry, which are explored in more detail in MJDTF profiles portion of this document, the only consistent information sharing metric available (through quarterly performance reports to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)) was the number of firearms entered into the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN).

The collaboration and information sharing metric is measured in two parts:

- Objective 2: Metric 5 (a) - Firearm serial numbers entered in the NIBIN
- Objective 2: Metric 5 (b) - The frequency of MJDTF intelligence meetings

Objective 2: Metric 5 (a) Firearm serial numbers entered into the NIBIN:

- Between FY11 and FY15, serial numbers belonging to 185 firearms were entered into NIBIN

- During the two-year period when NIBIN serial number matches were tracked by BJA, Between July 1, 2010 and June 30, 2012, zero hits were returned.

Objective 2: Metric 5 (b) Intelligence meetings among task force partners:

Literature shows among the most consistent benefits task forces produce is to eliminate what's has been referred to as the "silo effect" among law enforcement agencies that can hinder investigations. (Borakove et al. 2015). There were no numeric indicators in place consistently throughout the performance period capable of consistently measuring collaboration among MJDTFs, however. This metric is therefore analyzed from a qualitative perspective, based on interviews with MJDTF commanders. Because the benefits of collaboration and increased communication should be born out in the quality of MJDTF cases produced, this metric is monetized in the arrest section of this analysis.

Interviews with MJDTF commanders indicate that three of six task forces hold regular intelligence meetings. As reported by task force commanders:

- MRDTF reports holding more intelligence meetings than any other task force, including weekly gatherings in Helena and Bozeman. MRDTF also meets weekly with officers from Gallatin County, the Bozeman Police Department, Montana State University, the Belgrade Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Montana Highway Patrol.
- NWMDTF Commander Mark Mulcahy said that while he meets once a week with officers from Lake and Flathead counties, he does not convene regular intelligence meetings among all NWMDTF agencies.
- WCMDTF Commander Jeremiah Peterson says that Missoula task force officers routinely share intelligence, his task force does not routinely hold meetings for all participating agencies, including Mineral and Lake counties.
- EMDTF convenes members at monthly meetings attended by Montana Highway Patrol, the U.S. Border Patrol, the Montana Analysis and Technical Information Center (MATIC) at the Montana Department of Justice, and the Montana Department of Probation and Parole.
- SWMDTF reports holding quarterly intelligence meetings.
- TATF Commander CJ Reichelt says that his task force does not hold regular intelligence meetings.

Objective 3: Address narcotic-related violence

The narcotic-related violence domain is measured in three metrics, the number of guns seized, weapons-related criminal charges filed, and the number of arrests for violent crimes.

Objective 3: Metric 1

Weapons seized

Quarterly performance reports provided by MBCC show that 418 firearms were seized by MJDTFs during the performance period. Based on the average price derived from the Firearms Price Guide detailing the average value of 692 weapons, including Sturm, Ruger & Co., Glock Firearms and Remington, the value of each weapon seized during the performance period is estimated to be \$399. The total cash value of weapons seized, therefore, is \$276,108. With the JAG funding overlay, that sum is \$93,876. Because weapons seizures may be considered a transfer payment, meaning that resources are exchanged but not goods or services, the value of weapons seized is not counted in the benefits column forming the cost-benefit ratio.

Objective 3: Metric 2

Weapons offenses

Weapons offenses tracked on MTIBRS include misdemeanor carrying a concealed weapon, felony possession of an explosive device, and felony possession of a firearm by a convicted person. MTIBRS data indicates there were 21 weapons-related offenses in FY14 and FY15. It is therefore estimated that there were 28 weapons-related arrests during the performance period.

Objective 3: Metric 3

Crimes against persons

Between FY14 and FY15, 4.37 percent of all MJDTF offenses were associated with crimes against persons (124 out of 2,835 total charges). This percentage was applied to the total number of arrests during that period (1487) to estimate that there were roughly 33 crimes against person arrests each year of the performance period resulting in 162 total persons crime arrests between FY11 and FY15.

Data for fiscal years 14 and 15 shows the most frequently charged crime against persons among all MJDTFs was partner family member assault (PFMA). The number of PFMA crimes as a percentage of overall persons offenses for the performance period is estimated to be 32 percent, or 52 arrests related to that crime.

Resisting arrest was the second most frequently cited offense, constituting 20 percent of charges filed in FY14 and FY15. Assault with a weapon was the third most frequent crime, at 14 percent, or related to an estimated 23 arrests between 2011 and 2015. Felony criminal endangerment, involving the “substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another,” comprised 9 percent of all crimes against person charges, or an estimated 15 arrests for the performance period. (Montana Code Annotated 45-5-207). Assault with a weapon was the third most frequently cited task force persons offense, with the total number of weapons-related assault arrests estimated to be 23.

There were an estimated 41 crimes against persons classified as “other” for this analysis, due to the small percentage of the overall proportion of MJDTF-involved crimes. They include

statutory rape (1); assault on a minor (1); assault on a peace officer (1), and unlawful restraint (5), among others.

Crimes against persons are assigned a monetary value based on the academic literature detailing expenses incurred to victims resulting from such events. The most frequent task force offense against persons, partner family member assault was valued at \$5,305 based on Cohen and Piquero's (2009) estimate of the harm that would be incurred to the victim of a simple assault. The value of intervening in a victimization of that nature was multiplied by the total number of estimated arrests related to PFMA from the performance period, 52, to arrive at a total potential benefit of \$275,801. With the JAG overlay, the Byrne Grant may be seen as responsible for \$93,772 of the benefits of preventing such instances.

Assault with a weapon, the third most frequently cited task force offense, was valued in a similar manner. This crime was assigned a value of \$23,206 per incident based on an average of Aos et al.'s (2001) monetization of harm incurred to victims of aggravated assault, \$16,102, in today's currency, Cohen and Piquero's (2009) designated cost for the same crime, \$43,623 in 2017, and McCollister's (2010) estimate, which today would sum to \$9,891. The three accounts of the costs incurred to victims of aggravated assault created an average value that was applied to the total number of estimated arrests related to assault with a weapon for the performance period, 23. That calculation produced a value of \$527,763. With the JAG overlay, such interventions would be worth \$179,440.

Crimes against persons classified as "other," including statutory rape (1); assault on a minor (1); negligent endangerment (1); assault on a peace officer (1), and unlawful restraint (5), were valued at \$5,305 each, according to Cohen and Piquero's (2009) valuation for a simple assault. The calculation yields a societal benefit of \$215,470, of which \$73,260 could be attributed to the Byrne Grant.

Absent identifiable harm incurred by resisting arrest and criminal endangerment, no monetization was made for those offenses. Costs to victims of the crimes itemized above are estimated to be \$1,033 million total. With the JAG funding overlay, the value associated with intervening in crimes against persons would be \$351,153.

Objective 4: Reduce the supply and demand of dangerous drugs

The premise supporting continued funding of MJDTF operations is that by increasing cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies, there will be greater reductions in the supply of and demand for illicit drugs than the public would otherwise experience. This objective domain is measured in endangered children interventions, drugs seized, juvenile drug charges, possession arrests, and community events.

Objective 4: Metric 1

Endangered children interventions

Children exposed early to crime and addiction are placed at a greater risk of a criminal career (Cohen and Piquero 2009). By disrupting a family that normalizes drug abuse and crime, a reoriented child may be deterred from drugs involvement. As crime and delinquency carry significant costs to taxpayers, helping to steer a child away from addiction or criminality may

constitute the greatest economic benefit produced by MJDTFs.

Evaluations of reports submitted to MBCC show that MJDTFs intervened in at least 260 drug-endangered children cases between FY11 and FY15. It is unclear to what extent those interventions produced the long-term removal of a child from a drug-involved home. Similarly, the number of cases reported are not consistently reflective of the number of children involved with each case.

For a variety of reasons, data collected present an uncertain basis for estimating closely the economic value of endangered children interventions. One of the challenges stems from a new law created in 2013, felony criminal child endangerment, which made subjecting a child to drug sales or manufacture a violation punishable by 10 years in prison and a \$50,000 fine. The change gave law enforcement and child welfare workers more tools with which to hold drug-involved parents accountable, but it compounded already existing data challenges.

Prior to the change, MJDTFs were commonly left to rely on another statute, endangering welfare of children, which, as expressed in Montana Code Annotated 45-5-622, makes it a misdemeanor for an adult supervising a minor to expose the child to methamphetamine, its precursors, and related paraphernalia during a first or second offense. A third violation of 45-5-622 is a felony. MJDTF self-reports to MBCC between 2011 and 2013 cited 233 cases in which MCA 45-5-622 were cited. Twenty five offenses in violation of that statute were reported to MTIBRS in FY14 and FY15. Two cases of felony drug endangerment were reported via MTIBRS in FY14 and FY15. To what extent any of those charges set in motion the removal of a drug-endangered child from homes or other interventions capable of setting a juvenile on a better trajectory, interventions identified by Cohen and Piquero (2009) and others as financially significant, is unknown.

Tallying the value of MJDTF work with drug-endangered children was further complicated by interviews with MJDTF commanders and administrators who indicated that during the transition to MTIBRS task force output metrics including arrest numbers were underrepresented.

Inconsistencies between task force reports to CRG and those presented on MTIBRS can produce different accounts. That's especially apparent with EMDTF child endangerment enforcement activity in FY14 and FY15. Rather than two endangered children charges, which is what's reflected on MTIBRS for EMDTF counties in FY14 and FY15, EMDTF records show 12 drug endangered children cases involving 29 children during that period.

EMDTF self-reported drug-endangered children cases

Fiscal year	Time range	Total DEC cases	Total children
2011	07/10/10 - 06/30/11	12	19
2012	07/01/11 – 06/30/12	20	28
2013	07/01/12 – 06/30/13	15	24
2014	07/01/13 – 06/30/14	9	26
2015	07/01/14 – 06/30/15	3	3

In light of data challenges, the value of MJDTF drug endangered children interventions provided here should be interpreted broadly. Based on MTIBRS data that shows that two cases involving felony drug endangered children in FY14 and FY15, an assumption was made that one child endangerment charge capable of triggering the removal of a child from a drug endangered environment occurred for each year of the performance period, that five such interventions occurred.

The remaining 255 endangered children cases, reported to MBCC in the first part of the performance period and as Group B offenses on MTIBRS in the latter, were classified as misdemeanors. The little academic literature that exists on the costs associated with misdemeanor crimes only typically addresses the expenses associated with criminal justice system financial inputs, rather than costs associated with victimization (Aos et al. 2001). Absent additional contextual and outcome information related to MJDTF policing of misdemeanor child endangerment, offenses beyond the five labeled high-level offenses are not assigned a monetary value.

Based on Cohen and Piquero's (2009) low-end estimate of the value of intervening with a high-risk youth, which would amount to \$3.184 million in 2017 dollars, the estimated 5 felony endangered children interventions were valued at least \$15.921 million. The Byrne Grant may be seen as responsible for \$5.413 million of that sum. When applied to the 5 felony-level charges, Cohen and Piquero's (2009) high-end estimate for endangered children interventions, \$5.183 million, would yield a value of \$25.915 million for the performance period. JAG may be seen as responsible for \$8.811 million of that sum.

Because of the variety of factors affecting the monetization of this metric, the JAG supported value of MJDTF interventions in drug endangered children cases is estimated to be at least \$5.413 million and could be as much as \$8.811 million.

Objective 4: Metric 2

Drugs seized

Drug seizure constitutes a supply-reduction strategy typically resulting from interdiction, investigations, and undercover operations. This domain is measured in quarterly performance reports,¹⁴ which indicate drugs seized for the performance period include:

- 2.5 million grams of marijuana
- 37,481 grams of methamphetamine
- 4,851 grams of powder cocaine
- 1,507 grams of heroin.
- 2.529 million grams of marijuana

Drugs seized have an estimated total worth of \$41.807 million when broken down by gram.

¹⁴ Drug seizure amounts are reported in a variety of metrics, including by pound, kilogram, dosage unit, plant, pill, and gram. To streamline information delivery for analysis, the smallest common denominator, the gram, is used for reporting. This strategy enables a more comprehensive examination of the total amount of drugs seized by MJDTFS. It suffers from a downfall, however, in that using the smallest purchasing unit, one that is more expensive than a larger unit such as a kilogram, will inflate the value of drugs seized.

Marijuana constituted the largest sum, with the value of that drug estimated to be \$37 million; crack cocaine seized was estimated to be worth \$87,956, and powder cocaine \$553,482. Heroin was estimated to be worth \$150,747; meth \$3.998 million, and hash \$14,568. The seizures together reflect an estimated per-gram street value of \$41.807 million.

Because the value of drugs seized is considered transfer payment, meaning that resources are exchanged but not goods or services, the value of drugs seized is not included as a financial benefit in the overall return on investment ratio. (Mishan 1972).

Objective 4: Metric 3

Possession arrests

Drug sales impact society in a negative manner, producing “consumption externalities” such as strains on medical and mental health systems. (Kuziemko and Levitt. 2004; McCollister 2010; Cohen 1998, 2009). In 2017 dollars, Cohen’s (1998) estimates of the lifetime costs incurred by chronic drug users, including costs incurred by the criminal justice and medical systems, in addition to lost productivity, would range from \$735,857 to \$1.8 million. The implication of numbers such as Cohen’s is that successful drug abuse interventions stand to save a significant amount of resources.

There is a considerable amount of literature, however, that indicates policing drug users engaging in no other types of crime is not cost effective. (Benson 2008; Kuziemko and Levitt 2004; Rasmussen and Benson 1999; Sollars et al. 1994).

For insights on to what extent arrests for drug possession may impact public safety, this analysis turns to a discussion about deterrence. Criminal justice system activities may prevent crime by three distinct mechanisms. (Nagin 2013). One is incapacitation. Convicted offenders are often punished with imprisonment. Incapacitation refers to the crimes averted by the offenders’ physical isolation during the period of their incarceration. Montana Department of Corrections data shows that 3 percent of detainees sentenced to its supervision for drug possession between 2010 and 2014 received a prison sentence, and 77 percent of individuals sentenced to DOC custody for drug offenses between 2010 and 2014 received a deferred or suspended sentence. Those findings demonstrate that the criminal justice deterrent of incapacitation is used infrequently for individuals convicted of possession.

The second mechanism by which crime is curbed is through specific deterrence, which encompasses offender behavior after punishment. As discussed by Nagin, identifying the extent to which punishment produces a criminogenic effect versus one that deters necessitates longitudinal data on individuals who have experienced punitive sanctions resulting from criminal behavior and also that reflective of individuals without that experience.

The third crime-averting mechanism is general deterrence, which involves the threat of punishment resulting from commission of a crime. General deterrence, or the “perceived certainty of punishment” is frequently cited as the most cost effective in preventing criminal behavior (Nagin p. 4, 2013; Abrams 2013). General deterrence is discussed more at length in under Objective 4: Metric 5 and also in the “Net Costs and Benefits: Putting it All Together” section of this document.

Because there is no direct monetary damage incurred to victims related to the transfer of drugs absent violence, no victim harm value was assigned to possession offenses.

MBCC data indicates that between FY11 and FY13:

- Possession and possession with intent constituted 71 percent of arrests by primary offense
- Marijuana was the only drug involved in 59.13 percent of arrests
- Prescription narcotics, such as Adderall and Vicodin, were the only drug involved in 13.4 percent of arrests
- Methamphetamine was involved in 14.1 percent of arrests
- Two drug types, such as marijuana and methamphetamine together or some other combination, were associated with 4.11 percent of arrests

In fiscal years 2014 and 2015:

- Possession and possession with intent together totaled 29.81 percent of the total number of offenses, 2,835
- Paraphernalia charges constituted the second most common offense, at 26.63 percent of all charges

Objective 4: Metric 4

Fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs

Fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs is a felony. Examples of this offense include using a fictitious prescription to obtain pharmaceuticals and “doctor shopping,” or visiting multiple health care providers in pursuit of narcotics. MTIBRS shows that between FY14 and FY15, .39 percent of all offenses (11) were for fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs.

Objective 4: Metric 5

Community education events and local initiatives

The number of MJDTF community education events and local initiatives may be classified as a demand-side output. Examples of community initiatives include the “Grows to Gardens” program, which during the performance period repurposed property seized by MJDTFs from marijuana cultivation operations for growing food in school gardens; prescription drug take-back events; discussions with public health officials designed to help familiarize them with drug trends; the biannual Citizens’ Police Academy educational and drug awareness program, and visits with children in schools to advise them of the dangers associated with unlawful drug use.

Quarterly narratives indicate that MJDTFs facilitated 718 community education events during the performance period. Because of the variety of differing educational and community events held, applying a financial benefit to this metric is challenging. The value of general deterrence provided by such community educational events stands to be significant. As Abrams (2013) notes, general deterrence is the reduction in crime that occurs due to the expectation of punishment. A primary value inherent to MJDTFs is their work as high-profile anti-drug

ambassadors. Their presence in schools, at fairs, and with private companies serves as a reminder to the public of the dangers associated with drug involvement.

Estimating the economic benefit of general deterrence would present even more of an unwieldy task than the one already underway. Absent a mechanism for calculating the deterrent value of community events and local initiatives conducted by task forces, the value of efforts in this domain was estimated based on the average cost of taking one educational course at a community education center in Montana. CRG examined the costs associated with taking 10 different types of adult education classes, everything from CPR to auto mechanics and bookkeeping. The average value of an hour of time for such an educational program was compiled from the average cost of one-hour of instruction among 10 adult education courses. The estimate used here is therefore measured at \$9.42 per hour.

It should be said that an MJDTF community appearance can take anywhere from one hour to roughly 40, as is the case when NWMDTF engages in annual drug awareness outreach at the Flathead County Fair. Similarly, a presentation for the Elks Club or a school class may be attended by 20 individuals, while an MJDTF talk at a community roundtable discussion could be seen by hundreds. Absent detailed information on the total number of individuals present at such events, it is estimated that each of the 718 community events facilitated by an MJDTF was attended for one hour by 20 individuals each. When taking the average cost of attending a one-hour adult education course, \$9.42 per hour and multiplying that by the average number of attendees (20) and then multiplying by the total number of events reported for the Byrne Grant, one may estimate that the economic value of MJDTF community events between FY11 and FY15 totaled \$135,271. With the 34 percent JAG overlay, that benefit is estimated to be \$45,992.

Objective 4: Metric 6

Juvenile charges

Records provided by the West Central Montana Drug Task Force indicate that between FY11 and FY14, juvenile cases comprised 17.96 percent of the total number sent for adjudication, or 335 of 1,865. The Missouri River Drug Task Force reported sending six cases to juvenile court during the performance period. No other juvenile cases were reported by task forces submitting self-reported data for this analysis.

As with effective interventions in adult drug abuse, juvenile interventions capable of deterring youth from long-term drug abuse and associated costs, including health care, lost wages, and the potential criminal ramifications that may result, stand to save significant resources (Cohen 1998, 2009). Indeed, the same criminal justice literature applicable to endangered children interventions cited under Objective 4: Metric 1 above may be drawn from when seeking to value successful interventions with high-risk youth. To assign a monetary value to task force interventions associated with juvenile drug consumption, however, more detailed information related to task force outcomes is needed.

Impact evaluation

To gain perspective on MJDTF impact, it is helpful to compare statewide arrest numbers with those made by MJDTFs. Overall, comparisons between task force law enforcement and non-task force law enforcement arrests indicate that MJDTFs have a larger proportion of higher-quality

arrests. Of all drug arrests filed by non-MJDTF law enforcement agencies in Montana between FY14 and FY15, 95.88 percent involved narcotics and paraphernalia possession; 1 percent were for possession with intent, and .23 percent were for distribution. MJDTF data, meanwhile, shows that 89.75 percent of all MJDTF drug charges filed were for narcotics or paraphernalia possession during that time. Task force possession arrests were therefore 6.13 percent lower than the state average. Among MJDTFs, 4.54 percent of narcotic-related arrests were for possession with intent, reflecting 3.54 percentage points more than the overall statewide average. Task force distribution arrests totaled 4.1 percent of those filed, also demonstrating a higher sum than the statewide average among non-DTF law enforcement agencies.

Another strategy for evaluating MJDTF impact comes from contrasting overall offense rates in MJDTF counties with those in non-MJDTF counties. Offense rates are comprised of all crime reports and differ from arrest rates, which only represent instances in which an alleged offender is taken into custody. When interpreting crime rates, it's important to keep in mind that they can be shaped by reporting inconsistencies. (MBCC 2015). Other factors impacting offense rates include socioeconomics and population density. (Sollars et al. 1994). Treatment availability and “even fads” contribute further to drug use trends. (Office of National Drug Control Policy 2014, p. xiii).

Counties referred to as “non DTF” in the chart below are comprised of those reflecting no task force activity on MTIBRS in FY14 and FY15. As Montana is home to multiple drug task forces, there are just more than a handful of counties that show no task force activity in FY14 and FY15. Non-DTF counties examined for this analysis include Golden Valley, Musselshell, Pondera, Stillwater, Sweet Grass, Toole, and Wheatland.

As evidenced in the chart below, on first look one may see that MJDTF counties together have a higher crime rate, a higher Group B offense rate, and a higher property offense rate than non-DTF counties. Notably, however, the crimes against society arrest rate, which includes drug crimes, is slightly lower in task force counties than in the non-MJDTF counties, as is the crimes against persons offense rate. Such findings indicate that there were a slightly higher number of reports of so-called “vice crimes” in non-DTF counties, including offenses associated with drug use, unlawful wagering, and weapon violations. Similarly, the persons crime rate, which will be addressed in more detail below, was slightly higher in communities without an MJDTF.

	Crime rate overall-county offenses (per 1,000)	Person offense rate	Property offense rate	Society offense rate	Group B offense rate
Average DTF	50.39366337	7.826336634	20.6560396	4.395733783	17.21124
Average non DTF	39.72142857	8.164857143	17.28685714	4.714285714	8.906286

For insights on how MJDTF operations affect crime rates and therefore communities within their jurisdictions, this analysis turns to Lake County. In FY15, NWMDTF gained two new investigators, one at the Lake County Sheriff’s Office and another at the Polson Police


Department. There appears to be an immediate and significant impact on arrests resulting from the new hires, as indicated by the chart below.

Jurisdiction	FY14 MJDTF Arrests	FY15 MJDTF Arrests
Lake County	9	47
Lake Sheriff's Office	2	27
Polson Police Department	5	20
Ronan Police Department	2	0
St. Ignatius Police Department	0	0

Task force involved cases in Lake County grew by 422 percent between FY14 and FY15. For context, it's helpful to know that the overall number of drug charges filed in Lake County totaled 193 in FY14 and FY15. Of those, 56 were made by a task force.¹⁵

To gain perspective on to what extent if any the additional Lake County JAG staff affected drug use in Lake County, this report turns to the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), SAMS data reflective of admissions to state-licensed treatment facilities, and crime rates. (For more information on the presentation of YRBS and SAMS data here, please see the Appendix at the end of this document). The YRBS, which is an anonymous survey of high school

students in Montana counties every two years about drug use and other behavioral health trends, may be seen as a barometer for drug availability. As discussed in the Appendix, however, YRBS reports of drug use may be shaped by a fear of disclosure of unlawful activity. Readers should keep that caveat in mind when interpreting the data. YRBS data indicate that after the addition of the new task force staff in FY15, Lake County's reported marijuana use rates among high school youth remained stable, as did those reflective of heroin use. Cocaine consumption reports fell in FY15 from FY13, and reported meth use was up.



While SAMS data does not present the same validity challenges as crime rates and the YRBS, they may be interpreted to mean different things. For example, a rise in admissions to treatment facilities may result from a decline in drug availability, one that prompts addicts to seek help weaning themselves from narcotics. An increasing SAMS rate may also be indicative of a growing community drug problem.


In Lake County, the SAMS rate declined in FY15 to 3.53, from 4.28 the year prior. The slight increase does not suggest any significant shifts in Lake County drug use trends in FY15.

A primary rationale cited for supply-side drug


¹⁵ Both WCMDTF and NWMDTF include Lake County in their jurisdictions. Sub-grant narratives submitted in advance of annual funding cycles indicate that WCMDTF budgeted \$5,000 for overtime in Lake County in FY11 and FY15. For this analysis, MJDTF arrests made and reported on MTIBRS as task force related are classified as resulting from NWMDTF operations. It is possible, however, that WCMDTF provided support for arrests attributed to NWMDTF.

interventions holds that an investment in drug interdiction will yield decreasing property crime and drug use. A competing argument holds that the supply side drug policing increases competition among drug sellers, thereby causing an increase in violence as conflict arises over control of drug markets. (Goldstein 1985; Benson et al. 2001). There is also a body of literature that holds drug policing, by curbing the supply of narcotics, drives up the price of drugs and thereby leads to an increase in property offenses.

As indicated in the charts and graphs illustrating Lake County arrest and offense rates below, this analysis found no evidence to demonstrate that the additional FTEs decreased non-drug crime in Lake County. Nor is there any indication that non-drug crime increased significantly as a result of the new MJDTF staffing. The crime against society arrest rate did increase, however. Lake County's crimes against society offense rate consistently rose throughout the performance period, with FY15 marking a high of 20.43 offenses per 1,000 people.




Lake County Offense rates	Person offense rate	Property offense rate	Society offense rate	Group B offense rate
FY11	14.97	31.83	6.21	12.52
FY12	14.65	39.24	7.67	27.65
FY13	15.53	30.01	10.87	29.48
FY14	16.76	36.86	12.38	24.41
FY15	15.94	39.98	20.43	28.73



Lake County Arrest rates	Person arrest rate	Property arrest rate	Society arrest rate	Group B arrest rate
FY11	0.90	0.97	0.59	6.52
FY12	1.99	0.72	1.38	19.50
FY13	2.98	1.85	2.33	20.70
FY14	3.6	1.23	1.51	16.80
FY15	2.64	1.58	3.19	20.78

Another jurisdictional shift occurred at the end of FY13, when Judith Basin and Choteau counties left TATF. A review of YRBS and SAMS data, in addition to an examination of crime rates, suggested that Judith Basin saw no significant behavioral health indicator shifts or those involving crime trends after its departure from the task force. TATF Commander CJ Reichelt says that there was not a significant amount of task force activity in Judith Basin prior to its departure. Choteau County, however, had handful of TATF investigations annually prior to leaving the task force at the end of fiscal year 2013.



To evaluate to what extent if any Choteau leaving the task force may have impacted unlawful activity and drug use, this analysis turns to that county's behavioral health and crime indicators. As indicated in the graph to the left, Choteau after leaving TATF, experienced a reported decline in teenage drug use in all but one YRBS category, marijuana consumption. Cocaine use and that of unlawful pharmaceuticals, and meth all dropped from a 5 in 2013 to a 1 in 2015. Heroin consumption went from a 5 in 2013 to a 3 in 2015. Choteau County's SAMS rate, meanwhile, was .51 in FY15, down from a high of 1.2 in FY12.



Another case study may be found in Valley County. After the Big Muddy River Task Force shuttered in 2013, its dissolution left Sheridan, Valley, Roosevelt, Richland, and Daniels outside of any official JAG task force jurisdiction. Interviews for this analysis indicate that Richland County gained FBI coverage after Big Muddy was dissolved, so it is not used as a control group. Notably, too, Roosevelt and Sheridan counties, in addition to the City of Scobey in Daniels County, unofficially gained non-JAG task force coverage in August 2014, when they were included in the jurisdiction of an informal non-federally funded task force called Four Directions. (Four Directions partner agencies officially sign an MOU in January 2016).¹⁶

Absent the counties itemized above as suitable control groups, this analysis turns to Valley County. Before examining Valley County indicators in more detail, however, it is important to note that despite being officially unaffiliated with any task force in FY14,¹⁷ Valley County continued reporting task force activity. In fact, during the period Valley County was not officially affiliated with any task force, its crimes against society arrest rate increased.

A new TATF officer was hired to serve Valley County in FY15. With the new officer, Valley County reported an 11.6 percent increase in arrests, from 43 to 48. Valley County's low point for arrests during the performance period came in FY13, when it was still part of BMRDTF. That year 18 arrests for crimes against society were reported in MTIBRS. That number climbed through FY15, with a high of 48 arrests for the performance period.

¹⁶ Interview with Four Directions Commander Brian Kuntz

¹⁷ Conversation with Valley County Undersheriff Luke Strommen, TATF Commander CJ Reichelt.




Researchers have found an inverse relationship between drug enforcement and property offenses. (Benson and Rasmussen 1992; Sollars et al. 1994). The assertion accompanying such findings is that increasing investments in policing drug crimes incurs opportunity costs in other domains. In other words, that school of thought holds that more resources devoted to narcotics enforcement takes away from other priorities, such property and traffic offenses. (Benson et al. 1992; Sollars 1994).

To what extent that phenomenon could occur in Valley County in FY15 is debatable, as the new JAG-funded FTE presumably did not take away from existing resources. As illustrated in the graphs above however, property and society arrest rates do form a pattern reflective of an inverse relationship in FY13 and, to a smaller extent, in FY14. As the graph titled “Valley County Arrest Rates” above indicates, property crime arrests plateaued in FY12 and FY13 before dropping off in FY14. Crimes against society arrests, meanwhile, reached their lowest point in FY13, as BMRDTF was dissolving. In FY14, the comparably low property arrest rate coupled with an increasing society arrest rate could indicate that, with a waning task force emphasis on drug crime associated with BMRDTF’s departure, non-task force law enforcement focused more resources on crimes against society, and, as a result, crimes against property arrests decreased. It’s notable also that, while arrests for property crimes declined in FY14, incidents of reported property crime, as evidenced in the graph titled “Valley County Offense Rates” did not rise. The patterns suggest that even if there was a decreasing emphasis on property crimes in FY14, there

was not a corresponding increase in offenses, as has been tracked in other communities where trade-offs in policing priorities were documented. (Benson et al. 1992; Sollars 1994).

Property crime arrests did increase slightly after Valley County hired the new FTE, from 4.31 in FY14 to 5.19 in FY15, but the uptick is not sufficient to draw a conclusion that the increased staffing triggered a spike in other offenses. Similarly, group B arrests remained stable in that two-year period, hovering at between 39 crimes per 1,000 in FY13 to 43 in FY15. The Group B offense rate, meanwhile, dropped from 38 crime per 1,000 inhabitants to 29 in FY15.



Also relevant to this discussion is the Valley County SAMS rate. The SAMS rate in Valley County reached a peak of 3.7 in 2013, when crimes against society arrests were lowest, and declined to 1.83 in FY14. In FY15, it increased to 2.98. In a county with a population of 7,700 people, it is debatable to what extent such incremental changes in the SAMS admission rate is reflective of changes in drug consumption.

As to YRBS indicators, the survey indicates that all drug use metrics among teenagers in Valley County increased between FY13 and FY15.

Monetizing outcomes

The outcome of a program activity is what happens when the activity ceases (Rhodes 2007). Quantifiable outcomes include the number of MJDTF cases accepted for prosecution, court verdicts, and sentencing mandates. While data inconsistencies challenged quantification of outputs, this step of the cost-benefit analysis posed even greater uncertainties.

State adjudication

Information provided by MJDTFs for this analysis¹⁸ indicates that 4,700 cases were referred by JAG task forces for adjudication. Efforts to compile specific MJDTF outcome information included a request for case and disposition data from task forces. That information, when provided, served as a reference point for requesting from county prosecutors whether a defendant was found guilty, for example, or if charges were dropped. In response to CRG's informational request, county attorneys provided everything from a stack of individual judicial orders relevant

¹⁸ The number of cases referred for adjudication for BMRDTF and NWMDTF was imputed based on the overall ratio of arrests-to-cases for adjudication compiled from the other five JAG-supported task forces. That procedure was conducted due to the absence of self-reported information from NWMDTF and BMRDTF. The arrest-to-adjudication ratio used to calculate the number of cases referred to prosecutors by BMRDTF and NWMDTF showed that for every 100 arrests reported to MTIBRS and MBCC among the five other task forces, just more than 102 cases were referred for adjudication. The high number of arrests compared to those sent for adjudication was attributed to underreporting during the transition to MTIBRS.

to specific cases to hand-written reporting provided via scanned legal pad paper. What CRG produced from this line of inquiry was a handful of snapshots of task force outcomes.

Prosecutors within the EMDTF jurisdiction were especially responsive to requests for information. In Custer County, for instance, adjudication information received by CRG showed that of 66 individuals charged through the Custer County District Attorney's Office, 29 (43.9 percent) were found guilty on one or more counts. Of 47 charges filed against the 29 individuals, 10 charges produced an average sentence length of 4.8 years; 11 offenses produced suspended sentences, and 26 produced a sentence of on average five years of supervision.

Because of the sporadic nature of the documentation provided by task forces and county attorneys, this analysis instead refers to adjudication data from the Montana Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) as a basis for estimating the number of MJDTF cases forwarded by task forces that would have resulted in a judicial order. OCA data indicates that 45 percent of misdemeanor and felony drug charges filed statewide in district courts between FY11 and FY15 were dismissed. Of the estimated 3,022 cases MJDTF referred to adjudication in state district courts during the performance period, then, it is estimated that roughly 55 percent moved forward to a judicial resolution.

This estimate fails to account for the specialized training received by task force investigators in addition to the unique prosecutorial partnerships facilitated by task forces operations. In the absence of reliable data to demonstrate that a higher adjudication and conviction rate results from JAG operations in Montana, however, statewide estimates were called upon here.

MJDTF self-reports indicated that at least 1,231 cases were forwarded to municipal court. Another 113 cases were self-reported by task forces as being referred to federal court, task force self-reports indicate an estimated 440 cases were referred to youth court; 428 of the youth court cases resulted from WCMDTF operations.¹⁹

Drawing on the Vera Institute of Justice's "bottom-up" template for calculating state court expenses, an estimate of the time spent adjudicating a state and federal criminal case was made. For further guidance, OCA's Montana District Court Judicial Needs Model was consulted. That model found the average criminal filing in 2015 took 140 minutes to process, including time investment from judges and judicial officers. In 2010, that number was 141 minutes.

Case weights such as those articulated in the Judicial Needs Model offer a basic template for calculating the costs associated with adjudicating task force cases. Readers should keep in mind, however, that the variation in time and resources it takes to try one defendant can vary widely. So, the calculations provided here should be understood as broad estimates. Because of the wide variation in costs incurred by unique criminal cases, OCA does not endorse methodology used to estimate the court costs presented here. Meanwhile, the significant portion of cases sent to youth and municipal courts, prompted those expenses to be examined separately from state district proceedings for adults. The 113 cases reported by task forces (2.4 percent of all cases sent to prosecutors) for federal court adjudication, however, are costed based on state estimates.

¹⁹ Absent disposition data for FY15, the number of cases to specific courts for adjudication was calculated based on a percentage compiled from the average number of cases between FY11 and FY14.

The hourly costs of labor for staffing criminal cases involving task force defendants in state courts was derived from Montana Department of Administration salary records. To measure staffing levels, CRG looked to District Court Council, which sets policy and procedures for state courts and has directed that district court proceedings are staffed by one court reporter, a judicial assistant, and a law clerk, in addition to the presiding judge. (Montana Judicial Branch 2008) For a standing master, a three-quarter time judicial assistant or law clerk is recommended.

It was estimated based on state employee pay records through the Montana Department of Administration that a full complement of court staff, including a judge, a judicial assistant, a court reporter, and a law clerk cost between \$157.87 hourly including a fringe rate of 37 percent in fiscal year 11 to \$169.77 in fiscal year 15. Taking that sum and multiplying it by the Judicial Needs Model's finding that it took 2.33 hours to adjudicate a criminal proceeding in 2010 during the performance period yielded an estimate that 3,022 state court proceedings involving adult MJDTF defendants consumed \$626,740 in judicial resources. When applying the JAG funding overlay of 34 percent, the cost is estimated to be \$213,092.

Referrals to city courts were unusual with the exception of WCMDTF, which indicated in self-reported data provided to CRG that more than half of the cases it sent for adjudication between FY11 and FY14, 963 of the 1,738, were referred to Missoula Municipal Court. (Adjudication records were not available from WCMDTF for FY15, so an estimate of the number of cases was made based on the percentage of those forwarded to municipal court during the previous four years. That calculation showed 1,232 total cases between FY11 and FY15 sent to Missoula Municipal Court. The sizable proportion of cases referred to the city court prompted an examination of processing costs there.

Conversations with municipal court staff, including Missoula Municipal Court Administrator Tina Reinicke and Judge Kathleen Jenks, informed costing of misdemeanor adjudication expenses for WCMDTF and also for the 12 cases to city court reported by MRDTF. Those conversations indicated the amount of time it takes to adjudicate a city court case can vary from between 15 minutes for a defendant entering a plea, which, Missoula court staff estimated was applicable to roughly 69 percent of the cases processed during the performance period, to more than eight hours, as is the case with a jury trial. Jenks estimated that 1 percent of cases through her court result in a jury trial.

Estimates provided by city court staff informed costing of city court costs in Missoula, which is estimated to be roughly \$17,600 annually, prior to expenses associated with missed court appearances.²⁰ With the JAG overlay, municipal court costs were estimated to be \$5,985.62.

A discussion of the costs associated with adjudicating a juvenile cases is also most applicable to WCMDTF, which referred 335 cases to juvenile court between FY11 and FY14, comprising 19

²⁰ This number was calculated based on self-reports from WCMDTF that show an average of roughly 240 cases through the Missoula Municipal Court annually. Absent data from FY15, the number of cases to city court was estimated (269) based on the average number of cases referred as a portion of the total number of cases opened during the prior four years. Estimates of city court costs take into account the time of one court clerk to process cases and also that of a full complement of court staff, two clerks and the judge during court proceedings. Hourly labor costs provided for Missoula Municipal Court staff are based on state court employee hourly salaries provided through the Montana Department of Administration and include a 37 percent fringe rate.

percent of all referrals for adjudication from WCMDTF. According to Youth Court data from OCA, approximately 20 percent of juvenile cases annually are handled formally, meaning there is no court proceeding in most cases.

Based on the Judicial Needs Model, which found that juvenile case filings took 75 minutes of court time to adjudicate in 2015, costs associated with processing such cases were estimated broadly at half of that for adult offenders. If it is estimated that 20 percent of citations to youth court are handled formally, the total number of cases referred for adjudication to youth court through the performance period is estimated to have consumed \$16,351 of court resources. With the JAG overlay, youth court proceedings were estimated to be \$5,559.

Based on those calculations, CRG estimates the costs associated with adjudicating MJDTF cases at \$660,691 for the performance period. The JAG portion of that totals \$224,635.

Because court operations are static, they operate Monday through Friday during regular work hours regardless of caseload, adjudication costs related to MJDTF investigations are not included in the overall MJDTF cost-benefit ratio. A decline in MJDTF cases would not provide cost savings to the public, but rather lower caseloads and speed case-processing times. (Conversation with OCA administrator Beth McLaughlin; Vera 2013). Rather than as a direct economic cost resulting from MJDTF operations, therefore, task force effects on court operations should be conceptualized as an opportunity resource. In other words, if fewer MJDTF offenses were adjudicated, there could be more court time for presiding over civil disputes. “This type of taxpayer benefit will not typically result in a financial savings; it instead provides the means to benefit the public by lowering caseloads and hastening case-processing times.” (Vera 2013. p 19)

Offender supervision

Challenges estimating the total number of MJDTF cases resulting in a punishment prompted an examination of Montana Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) data. OCA outcome information is helpful in that it has the capacity to aggregate the number of cases resulting in supervision mandates of the total number of drug cases filed statewide during a given period of time. Of the total number of drug charges filed statewide between FY11 and FY15, OCA data indicates that roughly 41 percent result in the immediate imposition of a sentence, rather than one that was deferred, dismissed, yielded a not-guilty verdict, or was suspended.

Based on OCA data, CRG estimated that 41 percent of all cases sent by MJDTFs for state and federal adjudication, or 1,239, yielded an immediate punishment involving supervision. Supervision for this analysis includes community placement, prerelease centers, prison, or an alternative, such as drug treatment.

To better understand the costs involved in supervising those 1,239 offenders, CRG turned to Montana-specific data compiled by the Council of State Governments (CSG), (Chung et al., 2016). CSG’s analysis shows that of all original criminal sentences imposed in FY12, 6 percent resulted in prison, 66 percent probation, and 28 percent alternatives to supervision. This breakdown of admission patterns is used to estimate broadly for the performance period placement of MJDTF drug offenders and associated costs.

Within the criminal justice system, the marginal cost may be defined as the amount of change in an agency's total operating costs resulting from an increase or a decrease in one unit of output. (Henrichson and Galgano 2013). In this case, an individual sentenced to custody or community supervision constitutes one unit of output. CRG obtained from the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) marginal costs associated with incarceration for this analysis.

The Montana State Prison (MSP) houses all high-security risk inmates, such as those requiring placement in locked housing and detainees with serious medical needs and mental health issues. It also detains medium and low-risk offenders. The marginal cost per day of housing an individual at MSP throughout the performance period ranged between \$26.89 and \$30.37 per day.

Costs at Montana Women's Prison run roughly \$12 less per day. The lack of identifying information available for this analysis, however, including the gender of MJDTF targets, prompted CRG to use MSP marginal costs. A review of Council of State Governments findings related to sentencing outcomes in 2012 prompted an estimate for this analysis that 6 percent of offenders entering the corrections system were sentenced to MSP, 66 percent were sentenced to probation, and 28 percent for alternatives, such as drug treatment.

When applied the calculations itemized above to the broad assumption that 6 percent of all cases resulting in a prison sentence led to an estimate that costs involved with prison sentences was estimated to be \$775,452 total. This sum includes the cost of oversight for each of the MJDTF 1,239 offenders for a one-year period respectively, excluding juvenile and city court cases self-reported by task forces. With the JAG funding overlay, the estimated costs of incarcerating MJDTF offenders between FY11 and FY15 was \$263,654.

Three cautionary notes come with the presentation of offender oversight expenses itemized here. The first is that the estimated costs presented here do not include those associated with probation and parole violations. According to the DOC 2017 Biennial Report, Montana had a 43 percent return rate in 2013. The return rate defined by DOC is, "The rate at which adult offenders enter or return to an adult community correctional facility or prison in Montana for any reason within three years of release from any correctional facility." (2017 p. 43). The second cautionary note is that there is insufficient data available to identify sentence duration for individual MJDTF offenders. The absence of offender oversight information prompted a decision to base estimates off of supervision, including incarceration, alternative placements, and parole and probation, for a one-year period. The third cautionary note is that this analysis did not include an examination of sanctions through juvenile and city courts. The three data limitations combined indicate that offender oversight costs presented here constitute an underestimate.

While costing supervision expenses for adult felony offenders constituted an inexact exercise, punitive outcomes for juvenile and misdemeanor cases were even tougher to quantify. Data from MTIBRS indicates that in FY14 and FY 15, after drug charges, Group B offenses garnered the largest percentage of total MJDTF citations, 26.17 percent. Group B offenses are typically classified as misdemeanors, penalized under Montana law by a maximum of one-year in jail. The supervision estimates itemized above do not include costs associated with county jail stays related to misdemeanor cases, nor do they take into account oversight resulting from juvenile

citations.

The costs and benefits associated with MJDTF juvenile citations warrants additional scrutiny, as do those associated with misdemeanor crimes. The myriad uncertainties of costing outcomes prompts a recommendation that they be studied in future examinations.

DOC financial specialists noted in communications with CRG that most of the agency's incarceration alternatives, including those utilized for drug treatment and community placements, are operated on a contracted basis through outside entities. The state therefore pays a daily bed rate, so from the taxpayers' perspective, marginal costs don't apply to the alternatives category of offender supervision. Keeping that in mind, CRG compiled average costs for alternatives to incarceration at Connections Corrections, Passages, the Missoula Assessment and Sanction Center, and contracted prerelease and transitional living programs, in addition to those associated with probation jail sanctions, the START program, the Nexus and Elkhorn meth treatment facilities, and the Watch Program. The average cost of one bed day at those facilities during the five-year performance period ranged between \$83.73 and \$94.23. The estimated total expenses therefore of offender supervision at those facilities for the 28 percent of the offender population sentenced to an alternative placement was estimated to be \$11,248,719. The JAG portion of that expense is \$3,824,565.

DOC had no estimate for the marginal costs associated with community supervision expenses. The average cost of community oversight between 2012 and 2014, \$4.89, was instead used to estimate that the daily expenses associated with probation and parole. That service cost was calculated to be \$1.46 million for the performance period, of which JAG may be considered responsible for \$496,233.

As detailed in the chart below, the total oversight expenses for the performance period were estimated to be \$13.484 million. With the JAG funding overlay, it was estimated that supervision expenses related to the Byrne Grant were roughly \$4.584 million.

Total estimated MJDTF oversight costs annually				
FY	DOC	Probation/Parole	Alternatives	Total
2011	\$148,722	\$297,540	\$2,161,383	\$2,607,646
2012	\$138,128	\$268,054	\$2,005,564	\$2,411,746
2013	\$191,149	\$359,820	\$2,773,005	\$3,323,975
2014	\$132,520	\$241,973	\$1,920,641	\$2,295,134
2015	\$164,932	\$292,121	\$2,388,126	\$2,845,180
Total	\$775,452	\$1,459,509	\$11,248,719	\$13,483,680
With JAG overlay	\$263,654	\$496,233	\$3,824,565	\$4,584,451

Putting it all together: Net costs and benefits

This examination found based on academic literature, interviews, and a review of MJDTF reports, that the three most valued aspects of MJDTF work are communication, general

deterrence, and intervening with drug endangered children. When calculating the costs and benefits associated with MJDTF work, however, it became clear that there was a vital ingredient missing from the equation, the value of deterrence. General deterrence constitutes a primary MJDTF directive. As discussed by Horowitz and Zedlewski, however, it is “the least readily monetized.” (2006 pp: 57-58).

Similarly, the value inherent to the increased communication and coordination associated with task force partnerships constitutes a primary benefit of MJDTF operations. Yet, without streamlined metrics to gauge the value of this work, such as consistency in reporting required by the Bureau of Justice, which changed its reporting metrics frequently during the performance period under review, the best evidence in this category comes from interviews with MJDTF commanders and the quality of arrests garnered by the collaborative efforts.

Absent more advanced costing mechanisms for measuring the value of general deterrence and those capable of consistently tracking specific deterrence (outcomes related to incarceration and offender supervision), readers should keep in mind that the cost-benefit equations presented here are not complete. They fail to monetize the public safety value inherent to MJDTF officers mingling among locals at the county fair, for instance, or to what extent newspaper and television accounts of JAG stings deter would-be drug traffickers, or, as discussed by Horowitz and Zedlewski, the power of police to produce “not only crime, fear, and disorder reduction, but also “justice.” (2006. pp. 57-58).

Montana researchers do have some insights about citizen perceptions of drug law enforcement. The Montana Crime Victimization Survey, a survey of 1,996 randomly selected people conducted the spring and summer of 2016 suggest that most Montanans trust law enforcement. As indicated in the chart below, 84.6 percent of respondents said they “trust” or “somewhat trust” law enforcement.

Despite the MCVS findings high levels of citizen trust in police, the majority of respondents indicated drugs were a problem in their communities. Sentiments expressed in the MCVS regarding drug use are echoed by MJDTF commanders. They stated in interviews with CRG that, despite their best efforts, narcotic-related problems haven’t gone away. One commander compared policing drug crime during the Bakken boom’s peak to “drinking from a firehose,” while another commented, “There’s so much supply and it’s like whack-a-mole. You take two, and six pop up.”

Perceptions of Drug Crime					
	Greatly Decreased	Somewhat Decreased	Stayed the Same	Somewhat Increased	Greatly Increased
How have drug use and distribution changed in your community over the past 5 years? (n=1,919)	1.5%	5.5%	36.1%	38.6%	18.3%
	Trust	Somewhat Trust	Somewhat Distrust	Distrust	
To what extent do you trust law enforcement to deal with drug distribution and substance abuse problems in your community? (n=1,975)	46.4%	38.2%	10.3%	5.1%	
Is the abuse and/or distribution of these drugs a problem in your community?*					
	Yes				
Prescription Drugs	75.1%				
Methamphetamine	74.6%				
Alcohol	71.0%				
Marijuana	55.9%				
Cocaine	44.5%				
Heroin	43.1%				
Inhalants	41.1%				
Hallucinogens	37.5%				

*Note: The valid responses to this question varied for each substance, ranging from 1,803 to 1,926.

Readers should keep in mind the still unquantified value of general deterrence and problems quantifying the value of specific deterrence for this analysis when evaluating findings. Almost every step of this inquiry involved at least some level of uncertainty (Karoly 2008). Estimates provided here are based on calculations, estimates, and assumptions produced by data that is often inconsistent. The variability of the overall rate of return presented here, from 55 cents to 94 cents for every dollar invested, reinforces that point.

To better account for reporting inconsistencies and reliability challenges, four incarnations of benefit-to-cost ratios are presented. The first ratio is based on a low estimate of the value of MJDTF work policing drug endangered children and does not take into account victim harm that may have been averted by MJDTF interventions. Similarly, this estimate of rate of return does not assume task force interventions resulted in future crime deterrence, as would be the case if a chronic offender were incarcerated. The second ratio assumes MJDTF intervention in a property or persons crime would have averted costs to victims of the associated crimes. This perspective calls upon Cohen and Piquero's (2009) low estimate for the value of endangered child interventions. The third ratio takes Cohen and Piquero's high-end estimate for the value of endangered child interventions and sums it alongside the assumption that no victim harm was averted by MJDTF arrests. The fourth estimate posits that Cohen and Piquero's highest value for endangered child interventions is most appropriate, while also assuming that victim harm was averted in every instance of an MJDTF arrest for designated property or persons offenses.

In all cases, the value of training to outside agencies, estimated at \$60,491 for the performance period, and community events, gauged at \$135,271, were taken into account. Those two

categories together with the JAG overlay was estimated to be worth \$66,559 in benefits. Absent a methodologically sound strategy for valuing misdemeanor endangering the welfare of children cases, no harm-prevention value was assigned to such offenses.

It should be noted once more that between fiscal years 14 and 15, there were 25 misdemeanor cases of endangering the welfare of children reported on MTIBRS. That total was added to the number of cases reported to MBCC during the first three years of the performance period to arrive at a sum of 258 child endangerment cases (Before the statutory change creating a new felony drug endangerment category). Three of the 258 cases were carried over from FY11-FY13 to use as estimates for higher-value interventions). If even one tenth of the children involved in documented MJDTF drug-involved children cases were deterred from the type of criminal involvement detailed by Cohen and Piquero (1998, 2009), the societal savings would total more than \$75 million. Absent reliable outcome data, however, it would be irresponsible to assign such benefit to MJDTF work in this arena.

As discussed in the outputs section of this document, the more than \$43 million in drugs, cash, and weapons seized during the performance period are not included in the overall benefit-cost ratio, as they constitute what economists call a “transfer payment,” meaning that money is exchanged but not goods or services. For this reason, forfeiture is not counted in the benefits column of the economic analysis.

Regarding the monetization of drug offenses, a review of the academic literature failed to produce a direct monetary benefit for incarcerating individuals for possession or sale of narcotics. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests targeting and incarcerating drug users who engage in no other criminal behaviors beyond narcotic consumption may produce unintended consequences. (Kuzeimko and Levitt 2004; Benson 2008; Benson et al. 1992; Sollars 1992) That perspective, coupled with the lack of direct monetary damage incurred to victims related to the transfer of drugs absent violence, prompted a decision to assign no victim harm value to possession, manufacture, and distribution offenses.

Cost estimates remained fixed in all four ratio presentations, and the JAG portion of costs and

benefits is (33.708 percent) is applied to all estimates. The first benefit-to-cost ratio produces the least value for MJDTF work. It is based on Cohen and Piquero’s (2009) smallest value for removing a high-risk child and without calculating potential harm averted to victims. The result of these assumptions suggests that for every dollar invested in

BCA #1 No victim harm/ Low-end endangered child	Total estimate	JAG portion
Total incarceration/supervision costs	\$13,483,680	\$4,545,094
Total funding	\$15,916,047	\$5,364,999
Costs	\$29,423,728	\$9,918,183
Benefits	\$16,116,677	\$5,432,627
Ratio	0.55	0.55

Montana MJDTFs, 55 cents is returned. The calculation is based on MTIBRS data showing 2 task force charges between FY14 and FY15 were for felony child endangerment. If one were to assume that one high-level child endangerment intervention occurred during every year of the

performance period, it may be estimated that five such interventions occurred between FY11 and FY15. That sum multiplied by Cohen and Piquero's (2009) lowest value of removing a youth from a high-risk environment, \$3,184,183 in 2017 currency shows JAG MJDTF operations during the performance period produced a total societal value of \$16.117 million.

BCA #2 Low endangered children averted harm	Total estimate	JAG portion
Total incarceration/supervision costs	\$13,483,680	\$4,545,094
Total funding	\$15,916,047	\$5,364,999
Costs	\$29,423,728	\$9,918,183
Benefits	\$17,574,509	\$5,924,035
Ratio	0.60	0.60

The second benefit-to-cost ratio shows that every Byrne Grant dollar invested in JAG task forces during the performance period produced 60 cents in return, or a total of \$17.575 million in societal benefits of which JAG may be seen as responsible for \$5.924 million. This calculation is based on the assumption that task forces averted one instance of victim harm resulting from each offender they arrested for a property or persons crime in instances such crimes could be monetized. BCA number two includes the low-end estimate from Cohen and Piquero (2009) related to in intervention with a drug-endangered child. Crimes against persons were assigned a monetary value based on the academic literature detailing expenses incurred to victims resulting from such events. The most frequent task force offense against persons, partner family member assault was valued at \$5,305.5 based on Cohen and Piquero's (2009) estimate of the harm that would be incurred to the victim of a simple assault. The value of intervening in a victimization of that nature was multiplied by the total number of estimated PFMA offenses from the performance period, 52, to arrive at a total potential benefit of \$275,801 (51.984 arrests X \$5,305.5). With the JAG overlay, the Byrne Grant may be seen as responsible for roughly \$93,772 of the benefits of preventing such instances.

Assault with a weapon, the third most frequently cited task force offense was valued in a similar manner. This crime was assigned a value of \$23,206 per incident based on an average of Aas et al.'s (2001) monetization of harm incurred to victims of aggravated assault, \$16,102, in today's currency, Cohen and Piquero's (2009) designated cost for the same crime, \$43,623 in 2017, and McCollister's (2010) estimate, which today would sum to \$9,891. The three accounts of the costs incurred to victims of aggravated assault were then applied to the total number of crimes estimated for the performance period, 23, to produce a value of \$527,763. With the JAG overlay, such interventions would be worth \$179,440. (22.743 arrests X \$23,205.53 in potential victim harm averted X 34 percent JAG overlay).

Crimes against persons classified as "other," including statutory rape (1); assault on a minor (1); assault on a peace officer (1), and unlawful restraint (5), were valued at \$5,305.5 each, according to Cohen and Piquero's (2009) valuation for a simple assault. The calculation yields a societal benefit of \$215,469, of which \$73,260 could be attributed to the Byrne Grant. (40.6125 estimated arrests X \$5,305.5 potential value of harm averted = \$215,469.62 X 34 percent JAG overlay)

Absent identifiable harm incurred by resisting arrest, the second most frequently cited offense against persons with an estimated 32 cases, and criminal endangerment, which was the fourth most common persons crime with an estimated 14 cases, no monetization was made for those offenses. Costs to victims of the crimes itemized above are estimated to be \$1.033 million million total. With the JAG funding overlay, the value associated with intervening in crimes against persons would be \$351,153

Societal benefits associated with the savings of intervening in one property crime were calculated in the same manner. For instance, 50 percent, or an estimated 146, property offenses were for theft and shoplifting. The value of intervening in such crimes was assigned a benefit based on Cohen and Piquero's (2009) victim expenses for larceny and theft, \$531 in 2017 currency, and McCollister's (2010) estimate for the same crimes, which would total \$546 today. That calculation produced a total potential societal benefit of \$78,321. Had crimes been averted, the JAG program therefore would be seen as responsible for \$26,629 of that sum.

Criminal mischief, which involves the intentional destruction or tampering of property, was the second most commonly cited offense, constituting 14 percent of all charges in FY14 and FY15. Applying that percentage to the performance period, one may estimate that 41 such charges were filed. The misdemeanor crime was not assigned a monetary value.

At 13 percent, burglary was the third most frequently involved crime against property, yielding an estimated 38 offenses, the value of which were assigned through a review of McCollister's (2010) estimate for such a crime, \$2,188 in 2017 currency, and Cohen and Piquero's (2009) work, which estimated victim harm associated with burglary at what would be \$2,358 today. Those estimates produced a value of \$2,273 per crime averted and \$86,005 in total potential benefits. JAG may be seen as producing \$29,242 of that value. An average of Aos et al. (2001), McCollister (2010) and Cohen and Piquero's (2009) victim costs associated with robbery interventions produces a value of \$10,642. When applied to the 20 MJDTF robbery cases estimated for the performance period, that sum produces a value of \$216,838, had interventions or prevention occurred. The JAG portion of that sum would be \$72,725. Other crimes against property, included counterfeiting, embezzlement, credit card fraud, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and pickpocketing, constituted 16 percent of crimes against property offenses. Based on Aos et al.'s assignment for victim harm incurred by one property crime, "other" property offenses were valued at \$942, producing a JAG benefit of \$14,913. The total potential benefit in MJDTF work policing property crimes yielded a potential value of \$425,028, with the JAG portion of that benefit \$144,509

The third ratio, depicted below, includes Cohen and Piquero's high-end endangered children estimate, \$5,183,038, and the assumption that MJDTF's interrupted no victim harm. That ratio shows an 89-cent return for every dollar invested through the Byrne Grant.

BCA #3 Benefits high endangered children/ no harm averted	Total estimate	JAG portion
Total incarceration/supervision costs	\$13,483,679.81	\$4,545,094
Total funding	\$15,916,046.64	\$5,364,999
Costs	\$29,423,727.93	\$9,918,183
Benefits	\$26,110,952.00	\$8,801,508
Ratio	0.89	0.89

The fourth estimate depicted in the chart below is based on the assumption that MJDTFs intervened in victimization and thereby saved the costs associated with such events. It also includes Cohen and Piquero's (2009) highest estimate for the value of removing an endangered child. The calculations show that every dollar invested in JAG MJDTFs yields 94 cents in return.

BCA #4 High endangered children/Harm averted	Total estimate	JAG portion
Total incarceration/supervision costs	\$13,483,680	\$4,545,094
Total funding	\$15,916,047	\$5,364,999
Costs	\$29,423,728	\$9,918,183
Benefits	\$27,568,784	\$9,292,916
	0.94	0.94

Recommendations

1.) **Employ a contingent valuation survey**

Also called a willingness to pay (WTP) model, the contingent valuation approach asks citizens in surveys to place dollar values on preventing specific types of crime. Such a survey in Montana would ask how much people would be willing to pay for a reduction in crime or how much they would have to be compensated for an increase in crime. (Vera 2014, Karoly 2008; Cohen 2001). This approach attempts to capture the cost of crime to society as a whole and, as such, could prove useful in quantifying the yet-to-be valued commodity of deterrence.

2.) **Implement consistent performance metrics**

Changes in BOJ data collection were frequent throughout the performance period. Quarterly performance reports ceased collecting the number of arrests filed by task forces in FY14, for instance. Similar alterations occurred in metrics reflecting the number of individuals trained, training hours completed, and individuals charged with a felony versus those cited for misdemeanors. Absent consistent reporting metrics, there are few reliable ways to track JAG outputs, let alone to monetize outcomes.

3.) **Implement a tracking system that may be utilized to identify offender-specific adjudication and incarceration information**

Lacking JAG specific adjudication and incarceration information, this analysis relies on statewide data for monetizing JAG outcomes. In light of MJDTF's overall higher quality of arrest rates when compared to non-task force law enforcement agencies, the reliance on statewide averages to calculate adjudication and incarceration outcomes does a disservice to MJDTFs.

4.) **Record the number of cases sent for federal prosecution**

Interviews with MJDTF commanders suggest that some of their highest-value operations result in federal adjudication. As such, those performance metrics should be recorded and preserved for ongoing analysis. Such collaborative efforts constitute a central focus of the MJDTF mission. As such, measures should be taken to collect data reflective of task force successes working with partners across jurisdictional lines.

5.) **Streamline reporting metrics used to document MJDTF work with endangered children**

Interventions in endangered children cases constitute among the most valuable MJDTF outputs. As such, task force efforts in this arena should be consistently documented and recorded.

6.) **Compile and analyze data related to MJDTF juvenile citations and associated outcomes**

An analysis of juvenile drug interventions should occur to gain a better understanding of effects resulting from this specific policing strategy and the associated costs and benefits.

Appendix

Average cost of arrest calculation

Identifying accurate salary and benefit package earnings for task force officers during the performance period was complicated by the fact that task forces reported varying amounts of hard funding to MBCC. The Missouri River Drug Task Force (MRDTF), for instance, reported roughly 55 percent of its total labor costs to MBCC during certain years of the performance period.¹ Such reporting created the appearance of drastically lower earnings for task force employees.

Seeking to account for reporting gaps, all available documentation, including sub-grant narratives, sub-grant histories, and requests of task forces for information on hard funding not reported to MBCC, was evaluated. An hourly pay rate including fringe was calculated for each task force for each of the five fiscal years under review. A five-year average salary was applied uniformly across the performance period to better account for the appearance of fluctuations in pay rate created by inconsistent reporting.

For example, sub-grant narratives submitted to MBCC for the Missouri River Drug Task Force (MRDTF) indicated the hourly pay rate in fiscal years 12-15 ranged from \$28.26 in FY13 to \$44.20 in FY15. In FY11, meanwhile, sub-grant narratives indicated the hourly rate summed to only \$17.05. Because neither MRDTF's administrator nor its commander could confirm underreporting of hard funding in FY11, the seemingly low rate was averaged into the other years in the performance period to arrive at a five-year average hourly pay rate including fringe of \$33.21. That rate was used uniformly applied across the performance period as a basis for estimating the total expenses associated with making one arrest and sending one case for adjudication. This method was utilized when calculating costs for all six task forces.

The total amount of funding available for labor was first calculated based on the amount spent by each task force on contracted services and personnel, the two reporting categories used to account for such expenditures. For example, the Tri-Agency Task Force in FY11 reported to MBCC a total of \$212,000 for contracted services and nothing was allocated for personnel. The costs associated with one administrative staffer salary (\$30,000) was subtracted to yield the sum of \$182,500 available for task force law enforcement labor. That amount was divided by TATF's estimated hourly rate including fringe of \$28.7, based on the sub-grant narratives discussed in the preceding paragraph, to produce an estimate of labor hours available for law enforcement. This calculation for TATF in FY 11 yielded an estimated 6,359 available labor hours for law enforcement. ($\$182,500 / \$28.7 = 6,359$).

Operational costs were added to the hourly expenses associated with one unit of labor to produce what Wayson (1989) calls a "loaded resource unit." Again using TATF as an example, the task force in FY11 reported \$53,600 in operational costs and travel expenses through the JAG program, including local match. Allowing for expenses associated with administrative costs entailed noting that administrative salary costs consumed 14.2 percent of the budget allocated to TATF JAG program labor in FY11. Therefore, 14.2 percent of TATF's \$53,600 operational costs and travel expenses or \$7,568.42 were allocated to the administrative assistant. The remaining operation and travel costs of \$46,031.68 were applied to TATF law enforcement.

The remaining TATF operational and travel expenses was divided by the total number of law enforcement hours to produce an hourly cost estimate for law enforcement travel and operational expenses of \$7.24. ($\$46,031.68/6,359 = \7.24). To account for the role that the administrative support position plays in contributing to cost objectives, that employee's salary and operational costs was then added to the law enforcement officers' hourly cost. ($\$37,568.32/6,359 = \5.91 per hour). Other revenue, which totaled \$55,249.97, according to TATF's FY11 sub-grant narrative, was computed in an identical fashion and tallied alongside the hourly loaded labor unit. ($\$55,249.97/6,359 = \8.68 per hour).

The sum of expenses then was totaled to create a loaded resource unit, which reflects an estimate of the total costs associated with one hour of task force work.

For each task force, the estimated number of training hours performed, which was estimated to be 20 hours per FTE identified in JAG reporting, was subtracted from the total amount of labor hours available prior to calculating the cost per arrest and costs per adjudication. Similarly, the amount of time dedicated to facilitating community events was subtracted from the total amount of labor hours available to arrive at an estimate of the time remaining for investigations and arrests. Time investment in community events was informed by interviews with MJDTF commanders, who detailed the average hours and staffing levels required to facilitate a community event. The number of community events held by each task force was compiled by a review of quarterly performance narratives.

The number of arrests were then divided by the remaining labor hours to make an estimate of the total number of hours invested in making one arrest. The same procedure was used to calculate the number of hours invested in sending a case for adjudication.

For each task force, the overall proportion of JAG funding for the performance period, ranging from 25 percent to 50 percent of all documented funding, was then applied to find the number of arrests and the numbers cases sent for adjudication supported by the Byrne Grant.

Montana Youth Risk Behavior Survey

The Montana Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) is administered by the Montana Office of Public Instruction (OPI) every two years to students in grades 7 through 12. The survey, which is conducted in approximately 50 schools in odd-numbered years, monitors self-disclosed drug use. For this analysis, the February 2011, February 2013, and February 2015 YRBS surveys were used to measure the frequency of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and pharmaceutical use without a doctor's prescription. YRBS data from OPI reports the frequency of self-reported drug use based on percentages. For instance, 83.1 percent of Valley County high school students in 2011 reported that they had never taken a pharmaceutical drug without a prescription, while 4.8 percent of those surveyed reported doing so 40 or more times.

To simplify information delivery and to better compare drug use among teenagers in communities evaluated here, CRG created a five-point scale representative of answers provided by students to the YRBS. Five is representative

While the YRBS offers a series of questions about drug use, this report evaluates five types of drugs and one survey prompt: “During your life, how many times have you taken (the drug in question)?” On the CRG-created scale, the number one reflects either no reported drug use among the majority of respondents or minimal drug use. A five score, meanwhile, is indicative of a larger proportion of responses suggesting more frequent use of unlawful narcotics in comparison to the other counties evaluated.

When evaluating YRBS data, readers should keep in mind, that survey respondents may have a tendency to underreport illegal behaviors. (YRBS 2011)

Substance Abuse Management (SAMS) information system

The Substance Abuse Management (SAMS) information system through the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services Addictive and Mental Health Disorders Division itemizes the number of annual drug treatment admissions by county. CRG translated SAMS admission numbers into an overall drug treatment admission rate per 1,000 by county.

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